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THE REGULATION OF IN-HOUSE COUNSEL: OPENING THE PANDORA’S
BOX OF PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE
By Pascale Chapdelaine∗
Abstract

The number of lawyers who practice law in-house has significantly increased over the
last thirty years in North America. While in this part of the world, in-house counsel are
regulated in the same manner as outside counsel by their professional bars, the recent
decision by the European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd et
al. v. European Communities, reminds us that other parts of the world treat in-house
counsel very differently. This paper analyses the justifications for a similar treatment of
in-house counsel and outside counsel by the legal profession. While a detailed contextual
analysis of in-house counsel’s functions reveals a likelihood of greater vulnerability in
their ability to balance them with various ethical and professional duties, it also shows
that outside counsel face similar ethical dilemmas that may vary in degree or in nature.
The similar regulation of in-house and outside counsel is consistent with a poor
articulation by the legal profession of the scope of the duty of professional independence
from the client. And yet such duty exists. As it can conflict with paramount professional
obligations, including the duty of loyalty to the client, its scope is controversial. Leaving
the duty of professional independence from the client largely undefined is harmful to inhouse and also outside counsel, their clients, the legal profession and the public interest.
In-house counsel are in a privileged position to provide legal services in accordance with
fundamental values of the legal profession. As such, their contribution needs to be better
recognized and promoted. Generally, regulatory reform is necessary to nurture in-house
counsel’s ability to provide legal services as integral members of the bar, while
minimizing the risks that the privileged proximity to their clients present. Such reform
will inevitably benefit outside counsel who face comparable issues. A clearer articulation
of the meaning and scope of the duty of professional independence from the client,
together with tangible mechanisms to actualize it, will provide greater support to in-house
and outside counsel to better understand and integrate their various ethical and
professional duties within their role. It will also benefit all interested parties.
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I. Introduction

The practice of law in-house is by now well established and is increasingly shaping the
present and future of the legal profession in Canada and in the U.S.1 The percentage of
lawyers practicing law in Canada within a corporation (“in house”) or the Government is
significant.2 Commentators and practitioners predict that it is likely to grow.3 Statistics in
1

In-house counsel have their own professional associations: The Canadian Corporate Counsel Association (CCCA):
http://www.cancorpcounsel.org/; an illustration of the well established presence of in-house counsel in Canada is the
recent launch of the Magazine Canadian lawyer In House in December 2007. In the U.S., The Corporate Counsel
Magazine and the online magazine Corporate counsel.com : http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/index.jsp are addressing issues
that are specific to in-house counsel. G. C. Hazard, Jr., Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel (1997) 46 Emory L.J.
1011, at 1012. Professor Hazard outlines the forces at play that explain the phenomenon of the in-house counsel to
include: (i) the increased need of corporations for continuous legal assistance (ii) the specialization trend in the legal
profession (iii) the work environment of the large law firm comparing equally or less favorably to the environment of
in-house legal departments (iv) the strategic position of in-house counsel and power in selecting when and which
outside counsel to be retained and (v) the “affirmative self-assurance of corporate counsel”.
2
In Ontario, as of December 31, 2009, the percentage of registered lawyers employed as “Corporate Counsel” was 5%,
“other” i.e. including the “corporate and non-profit sector” was 13 % and 15 % in “Government” for a total of 33 % of
registered lawyers: “Law Society of Upper Canada 2009 Annual Report Performance Highlights”, at 6: available
online at the Law Society of Upper Canada website at http://www.lsuc.on.ca/with.aspx?id=1132 (last visited on
February 6, 2011). Those statistics do not give a further break down of how many of those registered lawyers actually
perform the function of counsel. In Québec, as of March 31 2010, 54 % of registered lawyers were in private practice
and 46% were in the category “other”: Rapport Annuel 2009-2010, Barreau du Québec, at 23, available online at the
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the U.S. show similar trends.4 Historical accounts of the legal profession point to ups and
downs in the importance, power and prestige of in-house counsel since the late nineteenth
century, with a “renaissance” of in-house counsel since the mid-seventies onwards.5
Among others, the influence of the growth in number and power of in-house counsel,
manifests itself by how it shapes the practice of law of outside counsel representing
corporations. 6

website of Le Barreau du Québec www.barreau.qc.ca/pdf/publications/rapports-annuels/2009-2010.pdf. The 20082009 Annual Report provides more detailed information. As of March 31, 2009, 16% of registered lawyers were
employed in a legal department ( 9 % in the private sector and 7 % in the public or semi-public sector) 5% were
employed as managers or executives, 19 % were employed by the Government or a municipality (5 % at the federal
level, 11% at the provincial level and 3% at the municipal level; these numbers do not include other public or semipublic functions such as being member of a board or commission, legal aid, attorney general office or municipal courts)
for a total of up to 35% to 40% of registered lawyers potentially performing the functions of in-house counsel: Rapport
Annuel 2008-2009, Barreau du Québec, at 19 and 38, available online at the website of Le Barreau du Québec:
http://www.barreau.qc.ca/pdf/publications/rapports-annuels/2008-2009.pdf (last visited February 6, 2011).
3

On earlier statistics on in house counsel and a discussion on the trend towards a growing number of in house counsel,
see: B. G. Smith, Professional Conduct For Lawyers and Judges, (Fredericton: Maritime Law Book, 1998) Chapter 10,
pp 2 and fol.; see the comments by several in-house counsel on the calculations made by their corporations that favor
hiring more in-house counsel rather than outsourcing legal services to law firms on a cost-benefit analysis : J.
Landry,“Table Ronde, Faire carrière au contentieux”, Le Journal, Barreau du Québec 40:3 (March 2008) 21 at 40.
4

For a U.S. perspective on the growing importance of “in-house” or “corporate counsel” in the legal profession, see R.
E. Rosen, “The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and Organizational Representation”, (1989) 64 Ind.
L.J. 479 ; M. C. Daly, “The Role of General Counsel Perspective, The Cultural, Ethical and Legal Challenges in
Lawyering for a Global Organization” (1997) 46 Emory L.J. 1057; for statistics on in-house counsel in the U.S. see:
S.L. Schwarcz, “To Make or to Buy: In-House Lawyering and Value Creation” (2008) 33 J. Corp. L. 497, in particular
at footnote 2; as of April 2011, the Association of Corporate Counsel (formerly the American Corporate Counsel
Association) had over 26,000 members in 75 countries worldwide (including a Canadian Chapter):
http://www.acc.com/ (last visited in April 2011).
5
C. D. Liggio, “The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel” (1997) 46 Emory L.J. 1201, at 1201-1207, refers to three
distinct periods of the in-house counsel status and role within the American legal profession since the twenties. The
1920s and 1930s were a period of “glory” for in-house counsel: their advice was highly sought by management and
their position in their corporation ranked comparably to the most senior ranks in their client corporation. The forties
until the mid seventies saw a decline in the role and prestige of the corporate counsel. Liggio attributes it to the
emergence of business school training and to the fact that their graduates were the newly highly sought after senior
executives. Finally, he characterizes the mid-seventies onwards as the “renaissance” of the corporate counsel. Liggio
attributes it to four factors: (i) an increasingly litigious society (ii) the greater legal complexity of doing business (iii)
the exponential growth of outside counsel fees and (iv) the application of business principles and techniques to legal
services, as well as being more critical of and outspoken about the legal profession. See also Daly, supra note 4, at 1059
and fol.; S. M. Kim “Dual identities and dueling obligations: preserving independence in corporate
representation”(2001) 68 tenn. l. rev. 179, at 199 and fol.; D. A. DeMott ,“The discrete roles of general counsel”(2005)
74 Fordham L. Rev. 955, at 957 & fol. ; S. H. Duggin, “The Pivotal Role of the General Counsel in Promoting
Corporate Integrity and Professional Responsibility” (2007) 51 St. Louis U. L.J. 989, at 995-1001.

6

The correlation between the increased influence and prestige of the in-house counsel and the nature of the legal
practice of outside counsel was already noted more than twenty years ago by A. Chayes & A. H. Chayes, “Corporate
Counsel and the Elite Law Firm” (1985) 37 Stan. L. Rev. 277, at 293-299; see also R.L. Nelson and L.B. Nielson,
“Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations” (2000) 34 Law &
Soc'y Rev., 457, at 457-458.
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In-house counsel in Canada and in the U.S., are regulated in the same manner as outside
counsel by the Codes of professional conduct of provincial (or state) bars and law
societies. 7 At least two professional bars address the practice of law in-house more
specifically.8 Le Barreau du Québec, for example, issued a report in 2008 on in-house
counsel, in which it discusses in detail their unique position and its implications for the
rules of professional conduct.9

There is a growing body of academic literature on the ethical issues of in-house counsel
in the U.S.10 This trend has been amplified in recent years in the aftermath of corporate
scandals that involved in-house counsel: WorldCom, Tyco, Rite Aid, Hewlett Packard
and Enron.11 The adoption by U.S. Congress of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 12 in an

7

Hereafter referred to generally as “Codes of Professional Conduct”. See: The Canadian Bar Association Code of
Professional Conduct 2009 (hereafter the “CBA Code”), Canadian Bar Association, available online at
http://www.cba.org/CBA/activities/code/ , xiv: specifies that the CBA Code applies to lawyers indiscriminately of the
nature of their practice (i.e. whether private practice, employee of a corporation or the Government); the Law Society
of Upper Canada, Rules of Professional Conduct, Adopted by Convocation June 2000, as amended) , (hereafter the
“L.S.U.C. Rules” ), available online at Law Society of Upper
Canada website at http://www.lsuc.on.ca/regulation/a/profconduct/; Rule 1, 1.02 “Definitions”, “lawyer”;
Code of ethics of advocates, c. B-1, r.1, (hereafter the “Québec Code of Ethics”) available online at the website of
Barreau du Québec
http://www2.publicationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca/dynamicSearch/telecharge.php?type=2&file=%2F%2FB_1%2FB1R1_A
.htm , 1.00.01; the Law Society of Alberta Code of Professional Conduct, February 2007, (hereafter the “L.S.A.
Code”), online: Law Society of Alberta
http://www.lawsocietyalberta.com/resources/rulesOfTheLawSociety_Y2RgvP.cfm , section “Interpretation” , 4.
“Definitions in this Code”, (n) “lawyer”.
8

Barreau du Québec, Guide 2008 de déontologie appliquée aux avocats en entreprise, available online on the website
of Le Barreau du Québec http://www.barreau.qc.ca/publications/avocats/index.html; the L.S.A. Code, supra note 8,
Chapter 12, The Lawyer in Corporate and in Government Service; other codes include occasional references to inhouse counsel for illustrative purposes or to emphasize the application of a rule of conduct to the in-house counsel: the
CBA Code, supra note 7, Chapter V Impartiality and Conflict of interest between clients, commentary 32 B: the
L.S.U.C. Rules, supra note 7, 2.02(1.1), 2.02 (5.1) and (5.2), commentary to 2.03(3) and 2.05 (3).
9

Barreau du Québec, Guide 2008 de déontologie appliquée aux avocats en entreprise, supra note 8: the Guide frames
the unique position of the in house counsel as follows: (i) the in-house has one single client, which is his employer, (ii)
the in-house counsel must ensure compliance with his duty of confidentiality towards his client and (iii) the in-house
counsel must maintain his loyalty towards his client-employer while preserving his independence and avoid conflict of
interests.
10

For instance, one symposium was entirely devoted to in–house counsel in 1997: “The Randolph W. Thrower
Symposium, The Role of General Counsel Perspective” (reported in (1997) 46 Emory L.J.); another symposium
focused on ethics in corporate representation: “Colloquium Ethics in Corporate Representation” (reported in (2005)74
Fordham L. Rev.).
11

For a review of the ethical issues of lawyers involved in these corporate scandals, see S. H. Kim, “The Banality of
Fraud: Re-situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper” (2005)74 Fordham L. Rev. 983; Regarding the Hewlett Packard
spying scandal, see S. Reisinger, “Saw No Evil” (2007) Corporate Counsel, January at 68.
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attempt to address securities fraud, as well as the counsel-corporate client relationship, is
also worth mentioning to explain this trend. For its part, the Canadian academic literature
on the ethical issues in-house counsel is scarce. 13

While the regulatory regimes of Canadian provinces and American states all embrace an
“egalitarian” approach towards in-house and outside counsel, the European scene is much
more diverse. The regulation of in-house counsel varies significantly from one country to
the other. At one end of the spectrum, there are jurisdictions where in-house counsel are
not allowed to be members of the bar while being employees of their client-corporation.
At the other end of the spectrum, in-house counsel are regulated by their bar in the same
manner as outside counsel. In between, in-house counsel are allowed to be members of
the bar, subject to entering into a special agreement that imposes specific requirements
regarding their employment to safeguard their independence.14 The highest court in
Europe recently reinforced the trend towards a different treatment of in-house counsel in
the legal profession. In Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd et al. v. European Communities,15 the
12

Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp. II 2002)) hereafter
the “Sarbanes-Oxley Act” or “SOX”; SEC Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 17
C.F.R. § 205.4 (2003) (Responsibilities of supervisory attorneys); 17 C.F.R. § 205.5 (2003) (Responsibilities of a
subordinate attorney).
13

The recent Canadian academic works dealing specifically with ethical issues of in-house counsel include: Paul D.
Paton, “Corporate Counsel as Corporate Conscience: Ethics and Integrity in the Post-Enron Era” (2006) 84 Can. Bar
Rev. 533; Smith, supra note 3, devotes Chapter 10 of her book to “The Lawyer as in-house counsel”; for an empirical
study of the ethical decision making of in-house counsel, based on a survey conducted with the Canadian Association
of Corporate Counsel, see: H. P.Gunz and S. P. Gunz, “The Lawyer’s Response to Organizational Professional
Conflict: an Empirical Study of the Ethical Decision Making of In-House Counsel” (2002) 39 ABLJ 241; for an
analysis of ethical issues of Government counsel, see: D. MacNair, “In the Service of the Crown: are Ethical
Obligations Different for Government Counsel?” (2006) 84 CBR 501; A.C. Hutchison, “‘In the Public Interest’: The
Responsibilities and Rights of Government Lawyers” (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall L.J. 105; for an account on the paucity
of Canadian academic work on legal ethics generally, see: A. M. Dodek, “Canadian Legal Ethics, a Subject in Search
of Scholarship”, (2000) 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 115; see also A.M. Dodek, “Canadian Legal Ethics:
Ready for the Twenty-First Century at Last” (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1 in particular at 44, where the author

points to important gaps in Canadian legal ethics literature, including the particular case of in-house
counsel.
14

For a discussion on the various regulations of in-house counsel in European countries see Joined Cases T-125/03 and
T-253/03 Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd et al. v. Commission of the European Communities, 2007, paragraphs 149 to 171,
Court of First Instance European Communities (herafter the “Akzo Nobel case, first instance”). See also the Opinion of
Advocate General Kokott, delivered on 29 April 2010, Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros
Chemicals Ltd v European Commission, at paragraphs 89 and 101.

15

Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd et al. v. Commission of the European Communities, 2010, C-550/07 P, The Grand
Chamber of the European Communities, available online at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin .
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Court, Grand Chamber confirmed the judgment by the Court of First Instance, 16 to the
effect that in-house counsel lacked the necessary professional independence from their
client by virtue of their employment link to their employer corporation.17 Hence it was
held that the ‘legal professional privilege’ (or ‘LPP’) 18 did not apply to the
communications between an in-house counsel and the other members of his employer
corporation. The case involved the judicial review of various decisions by the European
Commission based on the Commission’s powers of investigation on competition matters,
and in particular, on the Commission’s refusal to apply the LPP to certain documents that
were seized in the course of its investigation.

The differential treatment of in-house counsel in Europe may come as a surprise to many
North-American lawyers. This begs the question whether the legal profession in Canada
and also in the U.S., has overlooked the different status and position of in-house counsel
by assimilating them to outside counsel for regulatory purposes.19 Why has the well
established presence of in-house counsel, in number and power, been receiving so little
attention in the Canadian academic literature? Are in-house counsel more likely than
outside counsel to encounter ethical dilemmas that deserve greater attention and support
from the legal profession?20 What does this uncontroversial equal treatment between inhouse and outside counsel reveal about the legal profession?
16
17

Supra note 14.
Akzo Nobel case first instance, supra note 14, par. 166 to 174.

18

The “Legal professional privilege’ or ‘LPP’ refers to the protection of confidentiality of communications between
lawyers and their clients for which the following conditions must be present: (i) such communications are made for the
purposes of the exercise of the client’s rights of defense and (ii) they emanate from independent lawyers: the Akzo
Nobel case, supra note 14, at par. 117.
19

One possible explanation advanced is the desire and persuasiveness of in-house counsel not to be treated differently
than their outside counsel colleagues, for fear to be relinquished to a “second-class status” with the loss of prestige and
recognition from the profession that would ensue: S.R. Weaver, “Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel: a Structural
and Contextual Analysis” (1997) 46 Emory L.J. 1023, at 1031.
20

For a recent Canadian empirical study on ethical dilemmas encountered by in house counsels, see Gunz and Gunz,
supra note 13 at 252- 263 and at 279. The authors performed an empirical study that comprised the analysis of 484
questionnaires filled out by in-house counsel throughout Canada. The participants displayed low levels of
“Organizational Professional Conflict”. The authors explain these results by categorizing the respondents into three
distinct categories: “Lawyer”, “Technician” and “Observer”, and that not perceiving an existing organizational
professional conflict may be attributable to how in-house counsel views her role. On whether in-house counsel are
more likely than outside counsel to disciplinary actions, see Paton, supra note 13, at 544: the research performed by the

6

The main purpose of this article is to question the premises underlying the similar
treatment approach of the legal profession between in-house counsel and outside counsel.
In Part II, I discuss important characteristics of in-house counsel’s practice of law and
how they may raise ethical issues. I compare their situation with the reality of outside
counsel to assess the legal profession’s approach to treat inside and outside counsel alike.
While I point to some differences between in-house and outside counsel that may place
in-house counsel in a more vulnerable position, they are more likely to be variations in
degree rather than substantial differences. The privileged position of in-house counsel
places them at an advantage to provide legal services in accordance with the chore values
of the legal profession. This contribution needs to be better recognized and the proper
support needs to be in place to promote it even further. In Part III, I look at the current
regulation of the legal profession and whether sufficient support is provided to in-house
counsel and outside counsel. I take a closer look at the duty of professional independence
as the pivotal point to understand the uniform approach taken by the legal profession to
regulate in-house counsel and outside counsel. The duty of professional independence
from the client is poorly articulated in our Codes of Professional Conduct. It is
overshadowed by other duties that are all geared towards ensuring an undivided and
devout service toward the client. The uniform regulation of in-house and outside counsel
is consistent with a timid articulation of the duty of professional independence from the
client as well as of the ideal counsel. Yet the duty of professional independence from the
client exists and for that reason, it needs to be articulated better, for the benefit of
counsel, their clients, the legal profession and the public. I also seek to explain the lack of
consensus and representation by the legal profession of the “ideal counsel”. In Part IV, I
look at ways by which the legal profession can provide better support to in-house and
outside counsel through regulation. In addition to articulating more clearly the duty of
professional independence from the client and of the ideal counsel, I explore how Codes
of Professional Conduct, as binding instruments for members of the legal profession, can

author in the reported professional conduct cases of the Law Society of Upper Canada did not indicate a larger number
of disciplinary actions involving in house counsel than outside counsel.
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be used effectively to ensure that important structural aspects of the practice of law are
aligned to counsel professional duties.

The analysis presented in this article is based on a review of Codes of Professional
Conduct,21 recent Canadian and U.S. academic literature on in-house counsel, including
accounts of empirical research on in-house counsel, Canadian lawyer magazines,22 as
well as similar U.S. magazines. It is also based on my personal experience as outside
counsel and in-house counsel for over fourteen years. The greater emphasis of this paper
is on corporate, commercial in-house counsel in the private sector, but some of the
remarks may apply to counsel in the public sector (especially counsel working for public
corporations), as salaried employee to a single client, recognizing that Government
functions within the public sector bring another set of distinct issues that call for different
considerations.23 The main reason for the focus on corporate, commercial in-house
counsel is that transactional counsel are by essence not confronted with the institutional
scrutiny that results from the involvement of the judiciary and the more immediate and
visible need to balance between the client interests and duties towards the courts,
opposing parties and their counsel. 24 The transactional practice of law may therefore
expose counsel to greater ethical dilemmas and require more ethical vigilance and
awareness.
21

Reference to the “Codes of Professional Conduct” in this paper refer generally to the body of legal profession codes
of ethics and conduct in Canada. References are made to The CBA Code, supra note 7. While Canadian lawyers are
regulated by independent Provincial Bars or Law Societies, the CBA Code has been adopted by some Provincial Bars
and Law Societies, with modifications. It is used as a point of reference to define Canadian standards of conduct in the
legal profession: see “About the CBA Code of Professional Conduct”, available online at the Canadian Bar Association
website at http://www.cba.org/CBA/activities/code/ (last visited, February 6, 2011). References are also made to
specific Provincial Rules of Professional Conduct, in particular to the L.S.U.C. Rules, supra note 7, the Québec Code of
Ethics, supra note 7, the L.S.A. Code, supra note 7, and The Law Society of British Columbia Professional Conduct
Handbook, last revised in November 2010, (hereafter the “LSBC Rules”), available online at the Law Society of
British Columbia website at: http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/publications_forms/handbook/handbook_toc.html .
22

“Canadian Lawyer In-House” available online at the Canadian Lawyer website at:
ttp://www.canadianlawyermag.com/INHOUSE-Digital-Edition.html, (December 2007-December 2008) ; “Le Journal,
Barreau du Québec”, available at Le Barreau du Québec website at : www.barreau.qc.ca/journal (2003-2008), “Ontario
Lawyers Gazette” available online at the Law Society of Upper Canada website at
http://www.lsuc.on.ca/news/b/olg/(2005-2008), “National Magazine”, available at the Canadian Bar Association
website at: http://www.cba.org/CBA/National/Main/ (2003-2008).
23

For a discussion on the ethical issues of Government counsel see MacNair, supra note 13.
C. Parker & A. Evans, Inside Lawyers’ Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 214, argue that
corporate lawyers ethics (including outside counsel) may be more important than any other sector of the profession,
given that corporate lawyers are involved in almost every economic activity of our society.
24
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II. In-house counsel within the legal profession: distinct or familiar?
What is specific to in-house counsel’s practice of law25 and how does it contrast with or
corroborate our ideals of the legal profession, as expressed in the Codes of Professional
Conduct? Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. has characterized the role of the in-house counsel as
one of the most complex in the legal profession.26 In his work on the in-house counsel
movement in the U.S., Robert Eli Rosen discerned for his part three common
characteristics to describe the work and functions of the in-house counsel at the largest
corporations: (1) in-house counsel perform the same work as outside counsel in all areas
of practice; (2) in house counsel have a management function vis-à-vis the outside
counsel, acting as “corporate agents” for legal services on behalf of their corporation; and
(3) legal prevention functions. 27 An empirical study by Robert L. Nelson and Laura
Beth Nielson on how corporate counsel approach their work suggests that they navigate
between three distinct roles: “cops” i.e. “limiting their advice to legal mandates”,
“counsel”, i.e. “combining legal and business advice”, or “entrepreneurs”, i.e. “giving
priority to business objectives rather than legal analysis.”28 Another empirical study
based on interviews with Ontario lawyers, that was conducted by Margaret Ann
Wilkinson, Christa Walker and Peter Mercer, revealed that in-house counsel were
significantly more concerned about issues of role than outside counsel.29 In-house
counsel also exhibited higher on-going stress levels after a conflict with their client
25

For a description of the functions performed by in-house counsel in the U.S. see, Daly, supra note, 5 at 1068-189;
Kim, supra note 5, at 201-202; Kim, supra note 11, at 1001-1033.
26

Hazard, supra note 1, at 1011.

27

Rosen, supra note 4, at 504.

28

R.L. Nelson and L.B. Nielson, supra note 6 at 457, 460-461 & 468: the authors focused their research on interviews
with 54 individuals, 42 of whom are corporate counsel and 12 of whom are non-lawyer managers in a large financial
corporation, from three large U.S. urban areas. Their analysis revealed that about 17% were associated with the role of
the “cop”, 33% met the definition of the “entrepreneur” and 50% fell into the category of “counsel”.
29

M.A.Wilkinson, C.Walker and P.Mercer, “Testing Theory and Debunking Stereotypes: Lawyers' Views on the
Practice of Law” (2005)18 Can. J.L. & Juris. 165, at 183: the study involved the analysis of interviews conducted with
154 lawyers in large, medium-sized and smaller firms at four different –sized centers in Ontario.
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representative had occurred, than their outside counsel colleagues. 30 The authors
concluded from their study that in-house counsel constitute a distinct group within the
legal profession.31

I present here in-house counsel’s functions through five distinctive aspects: (i) in-house
counsel as salaried employees of a single corporate client (ii) the combination of legal,
quasi legal and non legal roles (iii) the “organic proximity” of in-house counsel (iv) the
impact of the remuneration method for rendering legal services from the perspective of
recipients of such services and (v) the legal department environment of in-house counsel.

A.

In-house counsel as salaried employees of a single corporate client

In Alfred Crompton Amusement Machines Ltd. v. Commissioners of Customs and Excises
(No.2), Lord Denning characterized the position of the in-house counsel as being no
different from the one of the outside counsel: “Many barristers and solicitors are
employed as legal advisers, whole time, by a single employer. Sometimes the employer is
a great commercial concern. At other times it is a government department or a local
authority. …In every case these legal advisers do legal work for their employer and for
no one else. They are paid, not by fees for each piece of work, but by a fixed annual
salary. They are, no doubt, servants or agents of the employer. … They are regarded by
the law as in every respect in the same position as those who practice on their own
account. The only difference is that they act for one client only, and not for several
clients. They must uphold the same standards of honor and of etiquette. They are subject
to the same duties to their client and to the court.”32 Yet, the employment situation of inhouse counsel to a single corporate client is the most frequently invoked factor to

30

Ibid, at 183.

31

Ibid, at 186.

32

[1972] 2 All.E.R. 373 (C.A.), at 376. In that case, one of the issues was to determine whether the legal professional
privilege applied to communications between legal advisers and their employer (who is also their client). The Court of
Appeal found that it did apply.
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distinguish in-house counsel from outside counsel.33 The concern is that this total
financial dependence of in-house counsel to their single client-corporation may
compromise their professional independence34 and place them in a situation of personal
conflict of interest.35 In order to properly assess the validity of this concern, one first
needs to clarify the meaning of “professional independence.”36 When analyzing the
potential impact of in-house counsel’s reliance on a single source of revenue on their
ability to retain their independent professional judgment, we generally refer to the type of
professional independence that a lawyer needs to maintain from external influences (to
the client) to unequivocally and loyally serve their clients’ interests. Such external
influences are addressed among others by the various conflicts of interest rules in the
Codes of Professional Conduct.37 The in-house counsel client is the corporation, not its
representatives.38 A situation of personal conflict of interest can thus arise when the
corporation representatives, on which in-house counsel’s performance evaluation and
remuneration depend, have expectations and exert pressures on in-house counsel’s role
that conflict with their duty to serve the best interests of the corporation.39 Performance
33

S.R. Weaver, supra note 19, at 1027; Hazard, supra note 1, at 1015-1016; DeMott, supra note 5, at 967-968; Kim,
supra note 5, at 257; Paton supra note 13 at 538; Duggin supra note 7, at 1035; E. Norman Veasey, Christine T. Di
Guglielmo, “The Tensions, Stresses, and Professional Responsibilities of the Lawyer for the Corporation” (2006) 62
Bus. Law. 1, at 11-12.
34

DeMott, supra note 5, at 967-968, Paton supra note 13, at 538; Veasy and Di Guglielmo, supra note 33, at 11-12:
although Veasy and Di Guglielmo acknowledge the risk that the independent professional judgment of the employed
in-house counsel may be at risk, they also note that: “…the employment relationship may also enhance an in-house
lawyer's job security as compared with that of outside counsel, giving the in-house lawyer a greater opportunity to
influence positively the company's legal policies.”
35

Kim, supra note 5, at 207-208. One way to approach this potential personal conflict of interest arising from the fact
that the in-house counsel is the employee of his client-corporation is the fact that this conflict is fully disclosed to the
client-employer and that by the employment of the in-house counsel the client has waived his rights under the conflict
of interest rules either explicitly or implicitly. However, if we take a broader view of professional independence from
the client as an obligation that is owed to the state and the public, and not the client, then it could not be the subject of a
waiver: see Kim, supra note 5, at 250.
36

The various meanings of professional independence are discussed in Part III of this paper “The Pivotal Significance
of the Duty of Professional Independence”.
37

This type of professional independence is referred to as “Three-Party independence”: see discussion below in Part III
of this paper.
38

L.S.U.C. Rules, supra note 7, 2.02 (1.1); for a discussion on the conceptual and practical difficulties posed by this
principle, see, A. C. Hutchison, “Who’s the Client and Why it Matters?” (2006) 84 CBR 411, at 425.
39

Kim, supra note 11, at 1053 and fol.: the author proposes structural solutions to address this misalignment. On the
function that a gatekeeping approach to the practice law of in-house can have on reinforcing the alignment of in-house
counsel’s duty to represent the corporation (and not its representatives) see: S.H. Kim, “Lawyer Exceptionalism in The
Gatekeeping Wars” (2010) 63 SMU L. Rev. 73.
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objectives and remuneration incentives that are pre-defined by the client-employercorporation can also have important effects on the ethical behavior of in-house counsel. It
is a common practice for in-house legal department performance objectives to be aligned
with the ones of the corporation.40 Ethical issues may arise when those performance
incentives and objectives are misaligned with in-house counsel’s ethical duties to retain
independent professional judgment and to preserve the client corporation’s best legal
interests.41

Similar misalignments between the best interests of the client-corporation and financial
pressures of counsel also exist in an outside counsel environment.42 From that perspective
alone, in-house counsel may be in an even better position than outside counsel to provide
legal advice that is unencumbered by financial considerations of billable hours, status and
prestige of retaining a client in the firm.43 Many commentators suggest that in today’s
highly competitive environment for legal services, the financial pressures experienced by
outside counsel may be different than the ones of in-house counsel, but they are no less
significant. 44 Yet, the “all or nothing” position that in-house counsel are facing should
not be underestimated.45 Outside counsel may rightly fear that their position could be
seriously weakened if they lose a major client, but they can still act for others. In-house

40

See the comments by Monique Mercier, Vice-President of legal affairs at Emergis, stating that it is essential for the
objectives of the law department to be aligned with the ones of the corporation and of the CEO: L. Vadnais,
“Maximiser le rôle de l’avocat en entreprise, passer avantageusement de conseiller juridique à conseiller stratégique”
Le Journal, Barreau du Québec 38:6 (June2006) at 20.
41

See the discussion in Part IV of this paper.
R. W. Gordon, “The independence of lawyers” (1988) 68 B.U. L. Rev. 1, at 34; Duggin, supra note 5, at 1035; Kim,
supra note 5, at 204: the author notes similarities with the law firm environment and high competition around legal
services; J. Landry, “Les avocats en enterprise Un Code d’éthique efficace s’inscrit dans la culture d’entreprise” Le
Journal, Barreau du Québec 40:2 (February 2008), 8: where some of the in-house counsel interviewed on ethical issues
of in-house counsel, point out that the greatest pressures they felt about compromising their professional judgment to
deliver a legal opinion that would please the client were in private practice, because the economic stakes (i.e.
potentially loosing a big client) were so high, and that in comparison, they never experienced such pressure as in-house
counsel.
42

43

See the discussion in this Part II, D below “Remuneration for legal services rendered”.

44

Supra note 40.

45

Kim, supra note 5, at 204.
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counsel have no other clients to fall back on. At the same time, some in-house counsel
argue that they are better protected than outside counsel are on the possible retaliatory
measures of their client, given that the dismissal of an employee counsel is a more drastic
step than quietly selecting a new outside counsel.46 Ultimately, the impact of the single
source of revenue ties of in-house counsel to their client corporation may not so much be
how likely it is that the corporation’s representatives will actually dismiss or otherwise
“punish”47 in-house counsel for not taking an agreeable position to their own interests.
Rather, the proper question is: how likely is it that in-house counsel will be more
influenced in their professional judgment by the perceived threat of such retaliation
(whether real or not) than outside counsel? While the “single source of revenue” factor is
a critical issue to consider when looking at the likely behavior of in-house counsel,
outside counsel are not immune from similar considerations. Also, the potential effects of
“single source of revenue” need to be assessed in combination with other aspects of inhouse counsel’s environment: some factors may add to the pressures and create personal
conflicts of interests, while some others may place in-house counsel in a more enviable
position to serve the interests of both their client and the legal profession.

B.

Cumulating business, quasi-legal and legal roles

In-house counsel often cumulate roles and responsibilities that entail distinct business and
legal functions.48 Commentators have pointed to increased ethical dilemmas created by a

46

See J. Landry, supra note 42, in which one of the interviewed in-house counsel points out that a client can more
easily change law firms than fire a lawyer who gives a legal opinion that the client is discontent with. He adds that
refusing to give an opinion that will please the client is no just cause of termination and that the in-house counsel is
better protected in that regard; See J. Landry, “Table ronde, Les avocats en enterprise, porte-étendard de la rectitude”
Le Journal, Barreau du Québec 40:1 (Janvier 2008) 11, at 12: the comments of Me Depelteau on the fact that there is
support and even respect in a corporate environment when an in-house counsel says that he wants to withdraw from a
case.
47

See Hazard, supra note 1, at 1015-1016, where the author adds the risk of being “professionally blacklisted”.

48

It is not uncommon to see in-house counsel cumulating human resource, ethics or privacy compliance management
functions with legal roles. See L. Vadnais, supra note 40, at 20. For a discussion on the determinant motivator of
cumulating various functions, attracting lawyers towards in-house counsel positions, see Daly, supra note 4, at 1072.
DeMott, supra, note 5, at 965 and fol. describes four roles generally cumulated by general counsel: (1) legal adviser to
the corporation and its constituents (2) corporate officer and member of senior management team (3) administrator of
the internal legal department and (4) agent of the corporation in dealings with third parties; see Veasey and Di
Guglielmo, supra note 33, at 25.
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juxtaposition of these roles by in-house counsel. 49 A typical example of a corporate
practice that may raise ethical issues is having the corporation’s legal counsel (whether
in-house or outside counsel) sit on its board of directors, therefore cumulating potentially
conflicting roles.50 Another example, at a more day-to-day level, could involve an in–
house counsel who is also fulfilling a management role in another department, such as the
human resources department. Hypothetically, she could be asked to implement a
company policy that is to grant less than the legal requirements for severance pay upon
the termination of employment of its employees, as a calculated effort to reduce the
company’s costs in this area. As a human resources manager, she is rewarded and
evaluated on the number of employee terminations that she handles per year at the lowest
cost. As a lawyer, she knows that the severance offers are below the minimum legal
requirements. In such instances, the in-house counsel /human resources manager may be
in conflict with her ethical obligations, depending on how we define the proper role of
counsel. 51 If in-house counsel are asked to simultaneously perform business activities as
well as legal services and are incented and rewarded on both (for example, with business
performance targets), then the lawyer-client relationship becomes at best blurry. 52
Although there can be a great synergy by this knowledge and expertise being combined,
one can think of many instances where the competent legal advice that ought to be given
in the best interest of the client-employer and the business objectives may diverge. This
places counsel in an ambivalent position that is less than desirable from an ethical
perspective.53 This has lead some commentators to take the position that in-house counsel
should refrain altogether from cumulating formal roles other than the one of legal advisor
to the Corporation and be very cautious in taking on any non-legal functions.54 Although
49

DeMott, supra, note 5, at 965 and fol.; Guglielmo, supra note 33, at 25.

50

Kim, supra note 5, at 247 & fol.; see also Veasey and Di Guglielmo, supra note 33, at 15 & fol.; Duggin, supra
note 5, at 1016 & fol.; C. C. Albert, “The Lawyer-Director: An Oxymoron?” (1996) 9 Geo. J of Legal Ethics 413.
51

I.e. whether she is a hired gun serving the immediate identified need of the client or a legal adviser with the duty to
uphold and promote the application of the law. The various conceptions of the proper roles of counsel vary
significantly depending on whether we see this role as based on the liberal advocacy ideal or the ideal of law as a public
profession: see Gordon, supra note 42, at 10-11.
52

See the discussion in this Part II, C (iv) below: “The substitution phenomenon”.

53

Weaver, supra note 19, at 1039 argues the more role counsel will cumulate, the more he is at risk to be in situations
of conflict of interest.
54
Ibid, at 1039-1040.
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this may appear as the sounder and safer approach to take, the pressure that in-house
counsel may feel from the corporate culture to take on additional roles should not be
underestimated. Refusing such advancement opportunities may be negatively perceived
by senior management as a lack of flexibility to respond to the demands of the
organization or a risk adverse mentality that runs counter to corporations’ expectations
with respect to their employees.

One could argue that the combination of roles by in-house counsel and the potential
conflict of interests that can arise from it can be resolved by way of an implicit or explicit
waiver or similar mechanisms by the employer-client. This would constitute the
recognition of ongoing potential conflicts and would be similar to the specific waivers
that clients sign when counsel disclose a situation of conflict of interest that may impair
their ability to serve the interests of the client without any obstruction. Although it may
work conceptually in some cases, in others, the conflict is irreconcilable. Take for
example the in-house counsel /human resources representative. What is there to be
waived? How is counsel to know which course of action to take to fulfill her management
role while respecting her duties to her client-employer and to the legal profession? How
could the corporation-client agree in advance to a blanket waiver in a truly informed
manner, without being able to fully understand all potential detrimental effects to the
client-employer of such waiver? Also, putting into the client-employer’s hands the ability
to waive potential conflicts of interest of counsel, that may be detrimental to the clientemployer and other affected parties, is only acceptable legally and ethically, if counsel
does not owe a greater overarching duty to the legal profession and to the public to
maintain a greater distance from the client, which on that basis could not be waived. 55

From a professional conduct perspective, lawyers have a duty to advise their client of
any portion of their advice that is not legal advice.56 This rule flows from the general duty
55

See E. W. Myers, “Examining Independence and Loyalty” (1999) 72 Temp. L. Rev. 857, at 863, where the author
refers to professional independence from the client as being absolute: “It inheres in the structure of the American legal
profession. This obligation is non-waivable by the client and non-negotiable. Indeed, two-party independence is not a
duty to the client at all--it is a responsibility of lawyers to the legal profession.”
56

CBA Code, supra note 7, at Chapter III, “Advising Client”, Commentary 10: reminds the duty of lawyers to clearly
advise client of any portion of their advice that is not legal advice; LSUC Rules, supra note 7, at 2.01(1) Commentary.
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of care and the duty to provide competent legal advice. In theory, when the duty to advise
the client on non legal advice is complied with, it can also mitigate any misunderstanding
on the scope to which the solicitor-client privilege may apply. 57 More generally, counsel
may be subject to the same standard of care for business advice as the one applicable to
legal advice. 58 While it may seem possible in theory to apply the rules of professional
conduct that require that the client be notified of the non legal portion of advice that is
provided, this is difficult to apply in practice. Except for the formal written legal opinion
that is usually accompanied by an extensive list of caveats and disclaimers, most
transactional work will involve a large amount of verbal opinions, contract negotiations
and drafts which inevitably and invariably contain a blend of legal and business
considerations and advice and for which no formal notice is ever given. The combination
of legal and business advice is also encouraged by a prevailing business and corporate
culture that affects in-house counsel and outside counsel. The fact that in-house counsel
are contextually more likely to be solicited to provide non legal advice than their outside
counsel colleagues does not exclude that this is a reality for outside counsel as well.59 The
business acumen of in-house counsel (and also outside counsel) is strongly valued and
nurtured and is often a prerequisite to survive and gain respect from the client-employer
representatives.60 Codes of Professional Conduct that require that counsel put the client
on notice on any advice that is non legal, seem to run counter to ongoing widespread
practices on how legal services are performed, both for in-house and outside counsel. In
that context, the foundations and application of such rules merit reconsideration to protect

57

Guide 2008 de déontologie appliquée aux avocats en enterprise, supra note 8, at 13 and fol.; S.R. Weaver, supra note
19, at 1037 and fol.; Veasey and Di Guglielmo, supra note 33, at 26.
58

Duggin, supra note 5, at 1015. Lawyers, by their professional affiliation and duties, are in some respects
expected to conduct themselves in a manner that is above the one of the ordinary citizen: see the L.S.A.
Code, supra note 7, at Chapter 8, Statement of Principle, which refers to applying the “highest business standards in the
community” when a lawyer is involved in the business aspects of the practice of law. Clients, in their dealings with
lawyers, expect that certain standards will be respected in the quality of their service: see for example the
L.S.A. Code, supra note 7, at Chapter 1, Commentary G.1, which states that lawyers are in a “quasi-official position in
society by virtue of privileges conferred on them by the state”.
59

Veasey and Di Guglielmo , supra note 33, at 27: the authors raise doubt on the extent to which outside counsel may
provide less business advice than in-house counsel.
60

See the discussion in Part II C. of this paper.
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in-house counsel, but also outside counsel, while ensuring that matters such as the
solicitor-client privilege are properly addressed.

The combination of business and legal advice or functions raises a more fundamental
question of the ideal model of lawyering that should be encouraged by the legal
profession: technician of the law, hired gun, gatekeeper or influential advisor? 61 In light
of the recent securities fraud scandals and the involvement of in-house and outside
counsel in them, this question is triggering a revived interest 62 that resonates beyond the
existence and role of in-house counsel.63 Describing the combination of various roles and
types of advice as a common denominator of the typical in-house counsel, Rosen noted
more than 20 years ago that the “Inside Counsel Movement” challenged the profession on
the degree of influence that ought to be exercised by lawyers.64 He gave the example of
preventive law programs that may “extend too far the profession's jurisdictional claims,
because they may require lawyers being complicit in too much non-compliance”.65 He
also suggested that the legal profession’s endorsement of a more independent and
influential counselor role could entail the recognition that “professional judgment
involves not only expertise but also political judgment about how to exercise corporate
leadership.”66 Codes of Professional Conduct currently allow significant flexibility in the
61

See Rosen, supra note 4, at 520, on the role of “ally to run the corporation profitably and legally”, as opposed to the
one of a policeman that in-house counsel plays in counseling corporate client on compliance matters; M. A. Wilkinson,
P. Mercer & T. Strong, “Mentor, Mercenary or Melding: An Empirical Inquiry Into the Role of the Lawyer” (1996) 28
Loy. U. Chicago L.J. 373; B. A. Green, “Thoughts about Corporate Lawyers after Reading the Cigarette Papers: Has
the “Wise Counselor” Given Way to the “Hired Gun”?” 51 De Paul L. Rev. 407 (2001); Veasey and Di Guglielmo ,
supra note 33, at 28 and fol., discuss three distinct roles for corporate counsel : advocates, gatekeepers, or persuasive
counselors, (opting for the latter role); for an analysis of the ability of counsel to play the role of gatekeepers, see: S. H.
Kim, “Gatekeepers Inside Out” (2008) 21 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 411.

62

Kim, supra note 11; Duggin, supra note 5, at 1020 states that “many lawyers lost their way because of a “dual failure
of vision.” They lost sight of the corporation itself as their true client and they saw “their role in unacceptably narrow
terms--as mere implementers or transaction engineers, rather than as broadly-gauged corporate counselors or advisers.”
(citing T. G. Bost, “Corporate Lawyers After the Big Quake: The Conceptual Fault Line in the Professional Duty of
Confidentiality” (2006) 19 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1089, at 1118).
63

Rosen, supra note 4, at 530.
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Rosen, supra note 4, at 530.

65
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style of lawyering that can be adopted by counsel in providing legal services. 67 It is also
clear that by their position, in-house counsel are more likely to be solicited to provide non
legal services, whether in an official capacity or not.68 The fluidity that the Codes of
Professional Conduct exhibit on how counsel may provide legal advice to their client is
also reflected by the ambiguity around the meaning of “professional independence.”69
Raising these issues more formally to remind counsel of their professional duties may
prove to be of great support and help clarify the ethical dilemmas that counsel, in
particular in-house, may face in similar situations.70 More fundamentally though, the
combination of various defined and less defined roles for in-house counsel and the ethical
issues that this interlinking with the client itself pose, raise fundamental issues about the
identity of lawyers in the legal profession. It raises questions on the balancing act and
tensions that subsist between the pillar duty of loyalty to the client and the duty of
professional independence from the client.71 At this point in time, it seems that the latter
is overshadowed by the former.72 This partly explains the difficulty to clearly identify the
better ethical conduct to adopt when legal and non legal functions are cumulated.

C.

“Organic proximity”

67

For example The LSUC Rules, supra note 7, commentary to rule 2.02 (5.2), last paragraph, on the “up the ladder”
reporting duties of lawyers, including in-house counsel, present various models of lawyering through the use of broad
language: “These rules recognize that lawyers as the legal advisers to organizations are in a central position to
encourage organizations to comply with the law and to advise that it is in the organizations' and the public's interest that
organizations do not violate the law. Lawyers acting for organizations are often in a position to advise the executive
officers of the organization not only about the technicalities of the law but about the public relations and public policy
concerns that motivated the government or regulator to enact the law. Moreover, lawyers for organizations, particularly
in-house counsel, may guide organizations to act in ways that are legal, ethical, reputable, and consistent with the
organization's responsibilities to its constituents and to the public.”
68

Veasey and Di Guglielmo, supra note 33, at 25.

69

See discussion about the different meanings of professional independence in Part III below; M. Beaudoin,
“Déontologie : marcher sur un fil de fer” Le Journal, Barreau du Québec 39:7 (July 2007) 9.
70

Paton, supra note 13, at 561 points out: “The ability for a lawyer in an in-house position to have a broader and more
complex influence on corporate decision-making is both enticing and dangerous: where does the line get drawn
between legal advice and business advice in such a context? Where should it be? How might the personal be detached
from the professional? The goal of regulators and the profession should be to assist corporate counsel in negotiating
their way through these issues. This is where reviewing the Rules of Professional Conduct and their application to the
unique challenges corporate counsel confront should be a first order priority.”
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Myers, supra note 52, at 858.
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Developing legal expertise and business knowledge of one single corporate client on a
full time basis, becoming an “integral part of the business team” often enhances the
quality of the relationship between in-house counsel and the corporation representatives,
up to the most senior ranks of the organization. It can also lead to a non trivial
phenomenon down the road: the in-house counsel identifies with the client73 and
gradually becomes the client, as a result of the “organic proximity” because of its
progressive, unwarranted, “natural” fusion. What are the perceptions and expectations of
the role of in-house counsel and how may in-house counsel interpret and interiorize their
role?74

(i) In-house counsel representing one person and one side all the time

In-house counsel’s representation of one organization at all times may expose them to
specific ethical issues. Some in-house counsel invoke the desire to be directly connected
to one product and to espouse the mission of their employer as a great motivator to
practice law in-house, as well as an important differentiator from working at a law firm.75
This particularity of in-house counsel’s entire devotion to one client begs the question of
the ideal model of lawyering that the profession should encourage and promote.76 The
single-client, total devotion situation of in-house counsel has been characterized as a
variant or another manifestation of the specialization of the practice of law.77 Elite law
firms often represent exclusively corporations and not employees (except for senior
73
See Kim, supra note 5, at 184: the author comments on the dual service of providing legal advice and acting as
director on the board of the same corporation: “As attorneys identify increasingly more with their clients' interests,
there is a concern over whether that type of identification results in a corresponding erosion of the ideal of the lawyer
as an independent steward of the legal system.”
74

As Duggin points out: “Given the multifaceted roles contemporary general counsel play and the influence they exert,
how these lawyers approach their responsibilities is at least as important as what they do”: Duggin, supra note 5, at
1019.
75

See the comments by Me Gagnon in J. Landry, supra note 3, at 21.

76

Gordon, supra note 42, at 2 discusses the overspecialization of lawyers having taken precedence over a more general
counseling function, in the broader context of his discussion on the loss of the ideal of Law as a public profession and
the ideal of independence from clientele.
77

Hazard, supra note 1, at 1012.
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management) in labor dispute cases, or pharmaceutical companies and not class actions
on behalf of consumers in product liability cases and so forth. The main reasons invoked
are conflicts of interest. The result is that elite law firms may also end-up representing a
particular segment of clients, and with that, a similar context and perspective to legal
issues most of the time. From that view, the position of in-house counsel may not be all
that different from the one of outside counsel practicing at larger law firms.78 However,
outside counsel get exposed to various organizations in different industries with different
practices and philosophies which give them points of comparison amongst their clients.79
They may more easily become aware, for example, that certain corporate strategies are
marginal and do not represent standard corporate practice. When warning their client
about a doubtful corporate practice, their exposure to other organizations may give them
more credibility to the corporation-client representative. From that perspective, the
position of outside counsel can nurture a certain distance and the ability to exercise
critical judgment. In contrast, by being exposed to one way of thinking and doing, all the
time, in a sense, to a single normative reference, in-house counsel may be more at risk as
a result of gradually losing their independent professional judgment. The inherent
paradox of in-house counsel is that their gain in knowledge, expertise, efficiency and
competence to better serve their single-client corporation comes with the loss of the
benefits that derive from exposure to a broader range of perspectives. For the legal
profession, the trade-off of constant proximity to the client means less encouragement to
look at broader interests that go beyond the immediate demands of the client. The
question of the suitability of representing one side and one client all the time magnifies
the tension in the legal profession between the two ideals of loyalty to the client and
professional independence.80 What is the optimal degree of proximity, confidence and
candor required between counsel and client to deliver the best legal advice? What is the
breaking point where that same proximity may compromise the manner by which the
78

D. Markovitz, A Modern Legal Ethics, Adversary Advocacy in a Democratic Age (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2008) at 219, explains how in addition to over specialization, the American bar is split between two
hemispheres: i.e. the lawyers representing large corporations and organizations and the ones representing individuals
with a very small percentage of the profession ever crossing the equator (citing an empirical study by J.P. Heinz & E.O.
Laumann, “Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure of the Bar”, in Lawyers: a Critical Reader (Richard L. Abel ed.,
1997) 27, at 31).
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services are rendered? Acknowledging the presence of a balancing act between gaining
relevant expertise and knowledge about the client-corporation’s business while at the
same time keeping enough distance to remain critical in order to deliver competent legal
advice is one way to expose the tremendous strength and power and also significant
vulnerability that can result from the single client-corporation environment in which they
evolve.

(ii)

In-house counsel as an “integral part of the business team”

One of the success factors of in-house counsel is often their ability to “become an integral
part of the business team.” 81 This is in fact one of the most frequently invoked reason by
lawyers who make the shift in their career from private practice to a corporate in-house
environment.82 They find it more rewarding and stimulating to be involved in the
business decisions and to be involved as early as possible in the business deal. As Nelson
and Nielson point out, when counsel practice in-house “part of their professionalism lies
in the practiced art of embracing their new clients' objectives as their own.”83 By gaining
an intimate knowledge of their client corporation’s business, not only is it encouraged
that in-house counsel provide input on the business aspects of a commercial agreement or
litigation matter, but it is expected. 84 Also, as an “integral part of the business team,”
counsel may be inclined to adopt negotiation tactics that may be acceptable from a

81

Kim, supra note 5, at 206 writes: “The differences between the internal motivations and attitudes of inside lawyers as
opposed to outside lawyers should not be discounted. Inside lawyers tend to feel as though they are integral members of
a team, and their goals are centered on furthering the long-term success of the corporate enterprise. These lawyers
“view themselves as facilitators and expeditors of their employer's goals to a greater extent than many outside lawyers
would.”
82

See the comments of the in-house counsel interviewed in J. Landry, supra note 3 at 21; Weaver, supra note 19 at
1035; more generally on the various motivations that incite a lawyer to practice law in-house, see De Mott, supra note
5, at 961 and fol.
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Nelson and Nielson, supra note 6 at 489.
Veasy and Di Guglielmo, supra note 33, at 22: “General counsel's position within the corporation provides added
value that is rarely matched by outside counsel. In-house counsel, and the general counsel in particular, usually have a
deeper and broader knowledge of the client's business than do outside counsel. In addition, in-house counsel's skills
may be specialized to match the corporation's needs.”; see sections below “The in-house counsel as part of the business
team” and “The Ideal In-house counsel”.
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business perspective but that nevertheless raise professional ethical issues.85 To what
extent can in-house counsel’s allegiance and loyalty to the representatives of the clientcorporation unfavorably taint their professional judgment?

The particular challenge for in-house, and also outside counsel, of providing legal
services to client-corporations, is that their client is the corporation, not its
representatives.86 However, corporations speak and act through their authorized
representatives. The best interests of the corporation may be hard to discern at times87
and counsel’s judgment will be inevitably influenced by how their senior representatives
present the corporation’s interests to them.88 The question is whether “being an integral
part of the business team” affects in-house counsel’s independent professional judgment
to a greater extent than it does for outside counsel.89 As Deborah A.DeMott observes:
“counsel may tend to address legal questions in a manner that pays allegiance to the
wisdom of executive-level commitments and perspectives, even in the absence of explicit
instructions from other members of the team.”90 Other commentators point to the “moral
interdependence” that develops between in-house counsel and the client-corporation,
making the disassociation of the acts of the latter from the ones of the former more
difficult. 91 As witnessed by the recent corporate scandals, in extreme cases, this sense of
85
The L.S.A. Code, supra note 7, at Chapter 11, “The Lawyer as Negotiator”, outlines the expected standards of
behavior of a lawyer involved in negotiations.
86

L.S.A. Code, supra note 7, at Chapter 12, “The Lawyer in Corporate and Government Service”, Rule 1.; Québec
Code of Ethics, supra note 7, at 3.06.05.01; Guide 2008 de déontologie appliquée aux avocats en entreprise, supra note
8, at 7.
87

Kim, supra note 5, at 199; see however the qualifier on the best interests of the corporation in the L.S.A. Code, supra
note 7, at Chapter 12, “The Lawyer in Corporate and Government Service”, Statement of Principle, being “as they are
perceived by the Corporation or Government”(underscored for emphasis), suggesting that the counsel needs to defer to
the Corporation’s appreciation of what constitute its best interest. These would need to be done in accordance with
rules of professional ethics: see Rule 4 of Chapter 12 which states that counsel should never take instructions that
would amount to a breach of professional ethics or that would encourage the commission of a crime or fraud.
88

Kim, supra note 5, at 257.

89

See for example Kim, supra note 5, at 199 &fol., where the author argues that the pressures of the complexity of this
lawyer-client relationship in the organizational setting is even greater in the case of the in-house counsel.
90

DeMott, supra note 5, at 969; See also Duggin, supra note 5, at 1004 where the author raises the risks that the special
relationship developed between in-house counsel and senior managers may compromise general counsel ability to give
objective legal advice; see also: Kim, supra note 5, at 207.
91

Paton supra note 13, at 560 (referring to an article by R.W. Painter and J. E. Duggan, “Lawyer Disclosure of
Corporate Fraud: Establishing a Firm Foundation” (1996) 50 SMU L. Rev. 225).
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loyalty can turn into overzealousness and lead to a complete misreading of in-house
counsel’s role to serve the best interests of the corporation. DeMott describes this
phenomenon as “misdirected and excessive loyalty.”92 This sense of loyalty that develops
between in-house counsel93 and representatives of the client-corporation may not
necessarily be all that different from the relationship outside counsel develop with their
key corporate clients.94 However, overtime, it is the devotion to one single clientcorporation that is likely to create a greater sense of attachment to the client-corporation’s
representatives that may distinguish in-house counsel from outside counsel.
The sense of belonging of in-house counsel to the business team and to the business may
be particularly appealing, but in-house counsel commentators recognize the tensions that
it creates with their professional duties.95 However, this factor, i.e. the “close affiliation”
to the business team, may be countered by the fact that in-house counsel, with their multifacetted role96 also have to “live with the deal” and the consequences of a chosen course
of action. 97 It gives them the incentive to think about the consequences of their actions
more thoroughly.. On the positive side, the proximity of in-house counsel to their sole
client-corporation also enables in-house counsel to gain more easily confidence and to
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De Mott, supra note 5, at 975. One extreme example of espousing the client’s cause and taking the least orthodox
courses of action to make issues literally “go away” is illustrated in the estranged in-house counsel character of Karen
Crowder incarnated by Tilda Swinton in the movie “Michael Clayton”. The in-house counsel of a large chemicals
corporation ends up hiring killers to get rid of their external counsel who was about to seriously compromise the
chemicals company’s interests in the middle of a huge environmental class action suit. It illustrates (albeit at an
extreme level) how a totally dedicated and devout counsel to her corporation felt pushed to commit a serious crime.
The film shows the pressures of the business culture of that fictional corporation as well as the isolation of the in-house
counsel as important contributing factors leading her to commit those crimes.
93

And that is required of them.
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Hazard points out: “Lawyers in a corporate law department, as they are often reminded, are part of the “corporate
team.” This slogan is a claim of primary loyalty by the corporate client. Yet, it is no stronger a claim than clients
implicitly make upon lawyers in independent practice. After all, the independent lawyer's client also can say, “What am
I paying you for?”: Hazard, supra note 1, at 1017.
95
J. Landry, supra note 46, at 12: see the comments of Me Nollet where he notes that while your client employer wants
you to be “part of the team”, as in-house counsel, you can never entirely “play” with the team and need to keep a
certain distance.
96

Including the one of enforcement, monitoring, compliance, see Part II B. “Cumulating business, quasi-legal and legal
roles”.
97

A. Macaulay, “In the House”, Legal Transitions, National Magazines legal Career supplement, 1:1 (March 2006, see
the comments by S. Bodley, Vice-President and Assistant General Counsel Centrica Direct Energy Toronto, whereby
the accountability factor, i.e. having to live with the deal was one noted difference with outside counsel and even a
motivator to make the move towards in-house practice.

23

interact with more candor with the representatives of their client-corporation. This allows
in-house counsel to provide better legal advice, positively influence the corporate client’s
conduct towards legal compliance, and even mitigate and reduce the likelihood of illegal
actions being committed.98 Some in-house counsel, drawing on their personal experience,
perceive their ability to influence persons of power to be much greater than if they were
practicing law as outside counsel.99 This special relationship of confidence and candor
between counsel (including outside counsel) and the client (through the corporation’s
representatives) is also thought to be made possible in great part because of an almost
absolute duty of confidentiality of the lawyer to the benefit of her client. In Canada, the
exceptions to the duty of confidentiality in favor of the client are indeed very limited.100
Although outside counsel can also develop relationships of confidence and great quality
of communication channels with their corporate client, in-house counsel, by their mere
physical presence, sole dedication to one client and network connection to the
communication channels of their corporation will inevitably always have access to more
information than outside counsel ever will. Hazard describes it as the “water cooler”
phenomenon.101
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A. Chayes & A. H. Chayes, supra note 6 at 283 describe how the “informal legal contact” may offer even greater
opportunity of “anticipatory law” than when inside counsel is involved in the formal strategic process (which the
authors also consider an important aspect of in-house counsel role in positively influencing management decision).
See J. Landry, supra note 42, at. 8, for example, the comments of Me Y. Gauthier.
99
See J. Landry, supra note 42, at 8, comments of Me Y. Gauthier, where he states that when confronted to undesirable
directions by the corporation, he would feel at ease to involve several corporation representatives and influence a
change in the course of action. His view is that he would not have been able to achieve the same results as outside
counsel.
100

In Canada, there are generally three exceptions to the duty of confidentiality to the client: (i) the public safety
exception (to prevent someone about to commit a crime that is likely to cause bodily harm), (ii) when specifically
“required by law” or (iii) when counsel needs to make his case against the client for example to defend himself, or in a
claim for unpaid fees for services rendered : CBA Code, surpra note 8, at Chapter IV, Confidentiality; see also L.S.A.
Code, supra note 7, at Chapter 7 rule 8 (c) has a rule broader than public safety as it allows to lift the confidentiality
obligations towards the client to prevent the commission “of any other crime”; LSBC Rules, supra note 21, at Chapter
V, rule 12; L.S.U.C. Rules, supra note 7, at 2.03 (2) to (5); Québec Code of Ethics, supra note 7, at 3.06.01.01.
101

Hazard, supra note 1 at 1019: “Here lies the most significant difference between corporate counsel and lawyers in
independent practice. The difference, simply stated, is in the factual conditions of their day-to-day work. To put the
point bluntly, a lawyer in independent practice is sheltered from the informal, back-channel information that flows
around the company water cooler. Instead, engagement of an independent law firm is necessarily predicated on a
distillation of the facts about the matter in question. This is so even when the outside lawyer is given all of the
documents and access to all of the company employees. Back-channel information simply cannot be recreated. And
there are times, I have been told, when outside counsel may be retained on the basis of selected facts precisely to
accommodate a response that provides a desired outside opinion.”
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There is a certain appeal for counsel to be involved in every step of the business deal up
to its conclusion. The perception is that counsel is then better positioned to influence the
business deal favorably from both a business and legal perspective than the lawyer
requested to do the paper work in the 11th hour. 102 However, the advantage of in-house
counsel over outside counsel in the level of information that is accessible to them103 can
also become a liability and place in-house counsel in a less enviable position and with
greater ethical dilemmas than their outside counsel colleagues. 104 When actions of the
client-corporation come under scrutiny, in-house counsel may be in a more difficult
position to prove that they were not aware of the actions under attack. 105 As Sarah
Helene Duggin writes, after reviewing studies of both inside and outside counsel
behavior that suggest that they make decisions based on “what it takes to survive and
advance” in their environment: “These studies highlight the importance of aligning the
objectives of both business managers and business lawyers with those of society. Shared
objectives need to include a strong sense of the importance of complying with the law. In
the end, perhaps the most useful aspect of Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC implementing
rules is not the resulting procedural mechanism but the clear message that norms are not
fungible and that business managers and corporate attorneys need to work together to
ensure corporate integrity.”106 Ultimately, the proper manner to address the risks posed
by this close proximity between in-house and also outside counsel and their clientcorporation representatives is tributary of the weight that the legal profession is willing to
give to the duty of professional independence from the client.107

102

See however De Mott, supra note 5, at 968 where the author points to the negative aspects of being involved too
early: “… to the extent general counsel participates at an early stage in shaping major transactions and corporate policy,
counsel's ability to bring detached, professional judgment to bear in assessing their legality may be compromised,
especially when the question of legality is tinged in shades of gray as opposed to black and white.”
103

Gordon, supra note 42 at 53: the author describes the fragmentation of information that outside counsel are left with
given the increased power of general counsel through increased internal knowledge and their piece meal outsourcing of
legal services.
104

Hazard, supra note 1, at 1017.
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See Veasey and Di Guglielmo, supra note 33, at 24, who also points out that the expectation and assumption that
general counsel ought to know everything may at times be completely unjustified.
106

Duggin, supra note 5, at 1039.

107

The duty of professional independence from the client is discussed in Part III of this paper.
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(iii)

The “ideal” in-house counsel

In addition to in-house counsel’s unique position encouraging them to “be an integral part
of the business team”,108 one phenomenon specific to in-house counsel is the conceptions
and expectations that transpire from their organization’s culture that shape the “ideal” inhouse counsel. Even though each organization has its own culture, the literature suggests
common traits of the “ideal” in-house counsel. The question is: how do these
expectations shape in-house counsel’s practice of the law? How may they influence their
ethical behavior? Ideal in-house counsel as viewed by CEOs and CLOs109 are often
described as having great business minds combined with pragmatic legal analysis skills, a
great knowledge of the company’s culture and of its operations, markets and
challenges.110 They are also very pro-active111 and a “take charge” person. Corporation
representatives typically loathe the “can’t do” attitude.112 They prefer someone who is
creative and solution oriented, and who works with the business representatives to
overcome any “legal hurdles” that may come along the way.113 One President described
the role of his in-house counsel as follows: they are “maestro with tainted glasses”:
explaining that they need to play more than one instrument and that they cannot easily
say no to a request from senior executives.114
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See section C (ii) of this Part II above “The in-house counsel as an “integral part of the business team””.
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For a review of the attributes valued by corporate clients of their in-house counsel see Daly, supra note 4, at 678679.
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J. Landry, supra note 46, at 12, see the comments of Me Desjardins.
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For a discussion on pro-active lawyering as particularly prevalent in in-house counsel culture, see Veasey and Di
Guglielmo, supra note 33, at 23.
112

See L. Vadnais, supra note 40, at 20, comments made by Jacques Parisien, President of Astral Media Radio.
In Nelson and Nielson supra note 6, at 460 and 490, analyzing the results of interviews performed 54 lawyers, the
authors explain how in-house counsel identify with their business and how they constantly adapt their roles to the needs
of their business. Lawyers are influenced by the reaction of business people to their legal advice and this influences the
way in which they will provide legal advice the next time: “When lawyers are criticized by business people or when
businesspeople resist legal advice in various ways (by not going to lawyers at all, or by choosing to go to a different
lawyer within the corporation, or by complaining to higher ups that the lawyers are not “team players”) it affects how
the lawyer will behave the next time. Although we have emphasized the ways corporate counsel “construct” their roles,
it is important to recognize that this is a reciprocal process among the lawyers, their “clients,” and other members of top
management.”
113
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Comments by Jacques Parisien, CEO of Astral Media Radio reported in L. Vadnais, supra note 40, at 20.
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The in-house counsel qualities described above contain great ingredients to create the
competent, client focused, timely and cost effective lawyering that the legal profession
strongly promotes and aspires to. The pro-activeness and mitigation work components of
in-house counsel can also promote broader public interests such as encouraging and
ensuring a higher level of obedience of the law by corporate actors.115 At the same time,
we need to ask whether on the contrary the ideal of the in-house counsel can create
immense pressures that may lead in-house counsel to misunderstand their role and depart
from their professional duties, making them more vulnerable than outside counsel?
Can the great business mind combined with the desire to please (even more so for an inhouse counsel with short foresight and lack of experience) lead an individual to take even
greater risks than the competent lawyer would do, espousing the very essence of the
corporation’s “risk taking DNA”? 116 Similarly, is the pressure to make the issues go
away, as a testimonial of in-house counsel’s wit and efficiency, likely to create more
professional conduct issues for in-house counsel than for an outside counsel?117 There is
some empirical evidence, and my personal experience supports that evidence, that many
in-house counsel are anxious not to be perceived as road blocks. 118 This state of mind
and the pressure felt around not providing any advice that may lead to that perception
may explain the (passive) role that some in-house counsel played in recent corporate
scandals.119 Thus, the “ideal” in-house counsel, from a legal ethics perspective, may not
always corroborate with the “ideal” in-house counsel as viewed from the employer-client
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Kim, supra note 5, at 251: “Corporate lawyers in particular have the unique ability to represent the legal system to
the client and thereby fulfill their public-oriented functions. When corporate lawyers perform their duties responsibly,
corporations can function more effectively, and given the central role that corporations play in society, the effective
performance of the corporation results in a greater public good.”
116

J. Landry, supra note 3, at 40, see the discussion amongst in-house counsel on the importance of internal support
within the legal department, especially with respect to more junior lawyers, who may have more difficulty to push back
on the unreasonable demands of a client.
117

Paton, supra note 13, at 544: the author’s research into the L.S.U.C. cases of professional conduct does not suggest
greater disciplinary actions against in-house counsel than for outside counsel.
118

See Duggin supra note 7, at 1021-1022, referring to the empirical study by Nelson and Nielson, supra note 6.
Veasey and Di Guglielmo, supra note 33, at 26: “A corporate culture that emphasized getting the deal done quickly
with too little regard for getting the deal done in an ethically and legally appropriate manner-and company lawyers'
inability or unwillingness to apply the brakes-may have been a factor contributing to the corporate scandals around the
turn of the twenty-first century. The pressure on general counsel and other in-house counsel to enable rather than
“inhibit” deals may be strong in those companies where managers are particularly skeptical about the value of the legal
department.”
119
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corporation representatives, or more importantly, as perceived by in-house counsel. As
Duggin points out, general counsel often enjoy enviable positions in senior ranks of their
client-corporation and consequently, they should use that authority to impose high ethical
standards and provide the necessary support to all in-house counsel (under their
supervision) in addressing ethical matters.120 Concrete means to encourage that behavior
and to address structural issues that may have opposite effects need to be considered. 121

(iv) The substitution phenomenon

We already discussed the risk of cumulating business with legal roles in one person and
how this could raise conflicts of interest.122 The “substitution phenomenon” is one
instance of cumulating business and legal functions, where the lawyer takes the business
decision in her hands without even consulting another corporation representative. In such
cases the in-house counsel acts as agent of the corporation and is no longer in a mere
advisory role.123 The substitution phenomenon is more likely to occur in a transaction
intimately intertwined with a heavy legal component, where no apparent business unit
has accountability. This may lead counsel to perceive (whether rightly so or not) that
there is no person in the organization more competent than the in-house counsel to make
the decision. Therefore, in-house counsel feel empowered to make the decisions without
any other consultation. This can also be fuelled by a desire to show initiative and
efficiency, by not encumbering business colleagues with legalese and hence to truly “add
value” to the Corporation.124 A similar but quite distinct situation occurs when in-house
counsel act in a non legal capacity such as when they need to perform purchasing
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Duggin supra note 7, at 1022-1023.

121

See the discussion in Part IV of this paper.

122

Part II, B. “Cumulating business, quasi-legal and legal roles”.

123

This situation is to be distinguished with cases where counsel overrides client instructions and decides to act as she
thinks would be the proper handling of the case. This is what authors as Wilkinson, Walker and Mercer describe as
acting as surrogate for the client, which, as the authors point out, should raise concern, especially when representing a
physical person, as counsel goes beyond representing her client: Wilkinson, Walker and Mercer, supra note 29 at 180
and 190.
124

On the ideal behaviors of the in-house counsel, see section C (iii) below: The “ideal” in-house counsel.

28

functions for the legal department.125 In his article on “The Inside Counsel Movement”,
Rosen talks about the substitution phenomenon as one that is likely to arise with outside
counsel as well. He also suggests that the in-house counsel intrinsic knowledge of the
corporation they serve positions them to make better decisions in the name of the client
than the outside counsel.126 The substitution phenomenon is also manifest in the
relationship between inside and outside counsel, the latter often being the sole voice of
the “client”.127 It is perfectly conceivable that when counsel substitute themselves for the
client-corporation, they do so while representing the best interests of the clientcorporation, without an organization representative being part of the decision leading to
it. This is so provided that in-house counsel act within the constraints of the general
agency relationship that is then being created. In a way, the substitution phenomenon
may even make it easier for in-house counsel to act adequately in the best interests of the
corporation, as in such case, there is no intermediary representative between them and the
client organization that could eventually taint their professional judgment unfavorably.

D. Remuneration for legal services rendered

The salaried status of in-house counsel to a single corporation employer and other
monetary incentives may increase ethical dilemmas for in-house counsel. 128 How can
this remuneration structure affect the receiver of legal services (i.e. the client-corporation
and its business representatives) and the counsel-client relationship? Does it create
additional ethical concerns? In-house counsel’s remuneration as salaried employees has
at least four consequences on the manner by which the legal services are delivered. First,
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The L.S.A. Code, supra note 7, at Chapter 8, “Lawyer in the business aspects of practice”, provide that when
involved in the business aspects of the practice of the law, counsel ought to employ the highest business standards in
the community.
126
Rosen, supra note 4, at 517: “The frailties of organization, in addition to the uncertainties of translation, help explain
why corporations need inside counsel managers. Outside counsel are not as well situated as inside counsel to determine
efficiently corporate goals from their client contacts.”
127

On the fact that corporation clients value such substitution, Rosen, supra note 4, at 518-519 explains: “Since inside
counsel are specialists in the legal needs of their corporation, they can manage outside counsel's ignorance: They can
assume responsibility for organizing, monitoring and auditing outside counsel's work.”
128

See the discussion above in this Part II, A “The in-house counsel as salaried employee of a single corporate client”.
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in-house counsel are primarily concerned with managing the work volume and the risk
associated to it. They have no parallel pressure to manage the amount of billable hours
that they perform in a year.129 They are usually incented to and rewarded for providing
legal services in a most efficient manner, unencumbered by personal conflict of interest
that may arise from revenue targets.130 From that perspective, in-house counsel can
exercise a strong independent judgment in the breadth of the legal services that are
required in the best interests of the client-corporation. Second, by not being billed for
legal services, the business representatives of the client corporation may be more inclined
to do “counsel shopping” (assuming that there is a medium to large in-house counsel
legal department) to get the more favorable legal opinion. Outside counsel are not foreign
to the phenomenon of “lawyer shopping” either. The unfavorable ethical behavior that
may ensue from such practice will largely depend on the legal environment of in-house
counsel. In a centralized legal department where there is consistency and good
communication channels between in-house counsel, such situation can be remedied fairly
quickly.131 In an environment where in-house counsel would not feel supported by their
fellow in-house counsel in taking difficult stances towards the client-corporation
representatives, this may create additional and possibly detrimental pressures on in-house
counsel’s independent professional judgment. By taking a position they know will not be
supported by their in-house department, they may also fear to undermine the credibility
of their department towards management. This last comment points to consistency of
service that are common to many organizations and do not only concern in-house counsel
in legal departments. Third, client-corporation representatives may create unmanageable
work load demands as a result of not having to pay directly for the legal services being
offered to them. This may place in-house counsel’s professional duty to deliver
129

On a related issue, see : L. J. Fox, “MDPs Done Gone: The Silver Lining in the Very Black Enron Cloud”, (2002)
44 Ariz. L. Rev. 547, at 554 and the author discussion against the instauration of Multi disciplinary practice (MDPs)
because of the additional financial pressures it would place on outside counsel independent professional judgment.
130

For example a personal conflict of interest could arise for the outside counsel asked to provide an opinion on the
likelihood of success of a legal claim. In grey area cases, the prospect of securing a substantive amount of work in the
future may be one of the factors influencing outside counsel to recommend litigation.
131

Formalizing uniform approaches to certain contractual clauses or legal issues that the employer-client often faces is
an effective approach to ensure consistency amongst the in-house counsel opinions and diminish the tendency of
“counsel shopping”. The impact of the structure of in-house legal departments is discussed below in Part II E. “Inhouse counsel legal and departmental environment”.
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competent legal services in a timely fashion to a strenuous test. Charging business
representatives for the legal services delivered though inter corporate transfers is
sometimes used to moderate the flow of legal services demands. However, such measures
can also discourage the business representatives to seek out legal advice132 and lead to a
decentralization and loss of control over legal services performed. Work overload in an
in-house counsel environment should not be underestimated.133 Factors which may
lessen in-house counsel’s ability to control volume of work include: their physical
proximity to the client representatives, and as stated above, the fact that there is no legal
fee for the services rendered. This can, if not managed properly give rise to an overflow
of demands from the employer-client organization. A counsel who does not have the
time, the expertise or the means to deliver legal services is in potential breach of her
professional duties.134 The complexity of the multi-facetted practice of in-house counsel
requires strong professional judgment. It must also be supported by rigorous mechanisms
in place to prioritize the work by degree of importance and minimize low risk, repetitive
or trivial requests.135 Last but not least, the significant increase in the proportion of inhouse counsel in the legal profession is undeniably related to the market realization that
in-house counsel can provide legal services of high quality at much lower costs than
outside counsel.136 This means a broader access to legal services to small and medium
sized entities who could otherwise not afford legal services. On that front, in-house
counsel serve an important goal of the profession to increase access to legal services, at
least to the corporation segment of the constituents they are meant to serve.

132

Duggin, supra note 5, at 1017 describes how in-house counsel often need to perform the functions of “legal services
marketer”, i.e. that they need to justify their existence and their value add in a corporate environment.
133

The danger of the lack of resources and support has been raised as a potential risk in the in-house counsel practice
environment: see J. Landry, supra note 3, at 40, the comments by Me Lebeau.
134

The duty of competence and integrity could be compromised: CBA Code, supra note 7, at Chapter I and Chapter II;
L.S.A. Code, supra note 7, at Chapter 2; LSBC Rules, supra note 21, at chapter 2 and chapter 3; Québec Code of
Ethics, supra note 7, rule 3.00.01 and 3.01.01.
135

Alleviating ethical issues resulting from an unmanageable volume of work is largely tributary of the support that inhouse counsel get from their legal department: see discussion in Part II. E “In-house counsel legal and departmental
environment”.
136

J. Landry, supra note 3, at 40: see the comments by several in-house counsel on the calculations made by their
corporations favoring hiring more in-house counsel rather than outsourcing legal services to law firms on the basis of a
cost-benefit analysis.
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E. In-house counsel legal and departmental environment

The structure of in-house counsel’s legal department can significantly contribute to
alleviating the ethical dilemmas and even to minimizing the risk of professional
misconduct by in-house counsel.137 Finding the right balance between centralized and
decentralized legal services can ensure the proper level of awareness and control of legal
and ethical issues as they arise.138 It also allows general counsel and in-house counsel to
deliver the level of legal services that are required in the best interests of the clientcorporation. Centralization also ensures a greater communication between in-house
counsel which in turn can provide better support to in-house counsel to navigate through
an array of complex co-existing and often conflicting roles. This can help in-house
counsel maintain a clearer perspective on their work and duties and hence support greater
professional independence.139 The extent to which such mechanisms (other than the
formal up the ladder reporting obligations for public companies in the U.S.) are common
practice is hard to determine. It seems reasonable to presume that in the often highvolume and pressured environment of in-house legal departments, education about and
support for discussions on ethical issues may be overlooked.140 My own experience as inhouse counsel is that although such training or discussion of ethical issues was not
discouraged per se. they were not part of any formal or informal training that was made
available to in-house counsel. In contrast, the outside counsel environment is more likely
to have mechanisms in place to address at least some of the ethical issues that may
arise.141
137
Veasey and Di Guglielmo, supra note 33, at 31, where the authors discuss the merits (but also the pitfalls) of inhouse counsel monitoring their company’s use of legal services and how it could indicate trends of
compartmentalization of legal services which could raise some red flags.
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For a discussion on legal department structures (i.e. centralized and decentralized) see De Mott, supra note 5, at 969;
see also Veasey and Di Guglielmo, supra note 33, at 35.
139

Hazard describes how general counsel should be unequivocal on the steps to follow and on the support their legal
team gets when facing potential ethical issues: Hazard, supra note 1, at 1021-1022.
140

Weaver, supra note 19, at 1050.
This is more likely to be the case in medium to larger size law firms than in smaller ones. One of such widespread
system and practice is the verification of any conflicts of interest before accepting a new mandate.
141
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A critical aspect of in-house counsel’s abilities to deliver competent legal advice in the
best interests of the client-corporation relates to their relationship with and access to
outside counsel. Workload issues or lack of expertise in specific areas of the law often
requires the assistance of outside counsel. Legal department budget pressures may come
in the way of making a decision that is in the best interests of the corporation. 142 Such
pressures143 may lead misguided counsel to take undue risks and take the matter in their
own hands even if they lack the availability or necessary expertise.144 This can arise
when in-house counsel would perceive the immediate budget constraints of their legal
department as more important than the interests of the client-corporation to receive
competent legal advice in a timely manner. Departmental budget pressures may also lead
counsel to select the nature of legal services that they will handle internally as opposed to
those they will refer to outside counsel not so much on the basis of required expertise, but
on the basis of how the outside counsel expense will be recorded from an accounting
perspective.145 In their relationship with outside counsel, in-house counsel, as agents of
the corporation, become the “purchaser” of legal services.146 The selection process, as in
any supply transaction, may raise conflicts of interest issues that in-house counsel should
be mindful of.147
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In their empirical study of corporate counsel, Nelson and Nielson report how the three types of ideal counsel studied
directly felt the bottom line pressures of their corporation and how they had to meet their business objectives: see
Nelson and Nielson, supra note 6 at 472. This can translate into feeling the undue pressure of meeting your own legal
department budget objectives.
143

Coupled with some of the attributes that are expected of the “ideal” in-house counsel, such as resourcefulness, take
charge attitudes, effectiveness, see Part II C (iii) “The “ideal” in-house counsel””.
144

For a discussion on the ethical duties of in-house counsel facing budget pressures, see Veasey and Di Guglielmo,
supra note 33at 35, where the authors note: “Counsel must resist budget pressures that have the effect of denying
needed legal advice to some operations. General counsel may have a duty in certain circumstances to assert persuasive
“lobbying” with the CFO and the CEO and, if necessary, take the matter up with the board. It may also be important to
inform the board of directors, if necessary, that some needed legal advice has not been provided because of budget
constraints.”
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De Mott also suggests that the justification of the size of their legal department (and maintaining it) may influence
General counsel (even unconsciously) decision to retain or not outside counsel, which may not always be in the best
interest of the client corporation: De Mott, supra note 5, at 972.
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See for example Daly, supra note 4, at 686 & fol.: the author describes the “purchasing agent” functions of an inhouse counsel.
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Even though in that case counsel is not performing legal advice per se, he would likely be bound by the conflict of
interest rules of professional conduct, either by his supervisory role of delegation for legal services, or by the fact that
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The contextual analysis of in-house counsel presented here leads me to conclude on the
one hand that the privileged position of in-house counsel in the intimacy, expertise and
knowledge with/of the employer client-corporation can also be a burden. The lack of
proper breathing distance may weaken their ability to take unpopular stands and to
maintain a broader and more detached view and to focus excessively on the immediate
needs of the client. The outside counsel can provide legal advice more from a distance
and in a more and more specialized fashion, and with an awareness of the landscape and
context in which such advice is sought. From that perspective, the in-house counsel may
be at a disadvantage. This analysis also reveals that while in-house counsel ethical
dilemmas may be higher than the ones of outside counsel, the difference may not be as
significant as would appear at first sight. Outside counsel also face ethical dilemmas that
can vary in nature or in degree from the ones of in-house counsel.

On the other hand, in-house counsel are well positioned, and in some cases perhaps even
better than outside counsel, to incarnate the core ideals of the legal profession and to
fulfill their professional duties towards the client. In-house counsel are positioned
favorably to fulfill their duty of loyalty to the client and to provide legal services in a
competent and diligent manner.148 Their undivided attention as well as the expertise they
develop with respect to the operations of their client can significantly increase the quality
and effectiveness of their service. Their position allows them to develop and nurture a
relationship of confidence with the representatives of their client-corporation that can
give them access to more important and timely information. This in turn can allow them
to provide effective legal advice that can have important preventive value and that can
better serve their client and even the public. The combination of legal, quasi-legal and
business functions often includes responsibilities to ensure legal compliance and
monitoring, as well as the timely implementation of new laws as they are adopted.
Providing legal services at significantly lower costs than outside counsel, increases access
such ethical conduct is also required in the performance of non legal services: see above discussion in Part II. B.
“Cumulating legal, quasi-legal and business roles”.
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This is provided that the proper legal department structure and support are in place as discussed in
subsection D. and E. of this Part II.
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to legal services for corporations who could otherwise not afford to do so. For these
reasons, and based on my own personal experience, the practice of law in-house needs to
be promoted rather than discouraged. To that end, adequate guidance and support by the
self-regulated legal profession is necessary to ensure that the vulnerabilities resulting
from in-house counsel’s structural environment do not overshadow the advantages that it
provides. At the same time, this guidance should also seek to alleviate those
vulnerabilities that are common at varying degrees to outside counsel. The next steps
require us to look at whether the legal profession currently provides such support and
guidance. More particularly, what are the various duties of professional independence, in
nature and in scope, how much weight is attributed to those duties, and what impacts
does it have on the regulation of in-house and outside counsel?

III. The Pivotal Significance of the Duty of Professional Independence

The adequate regulation of in-house counsel and outside counsel depends in large part on
understanding the nature and situating the place of the duty of professional independence
from the client within the legal profession. Without the existence of such a clear duty,
there is a priori no reason to regulate in-house counsel differently from outside counsel.
If on the other hand, such a duty exists, the contextual approach elaborated in Part II of
this paper raises some concerns that are more specific to in-house counsel. It also
illustrates areas of concern for outside counsel that vary in nature or in degree.

Professional independence refers to at least three distinct meanings that can create
confusion about its exact role in the legal profession. Codes of Professional Conduct,
refer predominantly to two meaning of “professional independence” as the independence
(i) from the state (both at the level of the profession and at the individual level) and (ii)
from any influences external to the client that may impair a lawyer’s judgment in
providing legal advice. A third meaning of professional independence is professional
independence from the client. The first meaning of independence, i.e. of the bar and the
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legal profession as a whole from any state interference,149 is the main justification of the
self-regulation of the legal profession. For instance, the adoption by U.S. Congress of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the obligations it imposes directly on in-house and
outside counsel has been criticized by many as an encroachment on the independence of
the legal profession.150 In its second meaning, the duty of independence has spurred the
development of detailed duties to avoid conflicts of interests (whether they arise from
another client or a personal situation, including doing business with the client who is
soliciting advice) and of established mechanisms on how to address such conflicts when
they arise.151 This second meaning of independence refers to circumstances in which the
lawyer may be in breach of her duty of loyalty to the client.152 Critical to the particular
position of in-house counsel vis-à-vis their client-corporation, is the third meaning of
professional independence: i.e. the duty to remain at all times independent from the
client153 and from her cause, i.e. “the lawyer standing apart from the client and giving
detached, objective advice, fully informed by the law, experience, and the practical
ramifications of the client's situation”,154 balancing the lawyer’s obligations beyond those
owed to the client, i.e. to the profession, to the courts and the public interest. The
distinction between the second type of professional independence (i.e. more akin to the
duty of loyalty owed to the client ) and the third type, i.e. independence from the client is
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See the CBA Code, supra note 7, at Chapter XXII, Independence of the Bar. The Independence of the Bar from any
state interference was characterized as one of the “hallmarks of a free society” by the Supreme Court of Canada in A.G.
Can v. Law Society of B.C., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307 at 335; For a recent discussion on the importance of the independence
of the Bar, see the Remarks of the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, P.C. Chief Justice of Canada, “Professional
Independence and the Rule of Law” (2007) 23 Windsor Rev. Legal & Soc. Issues, 3;
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Paton supra note 13, at 539-540 refers to Canadian law firms opposing to state intervention and regulation

encroaching upon profession self regulation.
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Another duty that flows from the duty of independence of the lawyer is exemplified by the rules dealing with
outside interests to the practice of law: the CBA Code, supra note 7, at chapter VII Rule on “Outside interest and the
practice of law”; see also Chapter XXII, Independence of the Bar, where it cites the following duties of the lawyer as
manifestations of the Independence of the Bar: the duty of integrity, of honesty and candor, the duty of confidentiality
and the duty to represent the client resolutely and fearlessly.
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Myers, supra note 52 at 861.
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Myers, supra note 52, at 862: the author notes that “In contrast to independence from the state, independence from
clients is a much more debated and elusive ideal.”
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Myers, supra note 52, at 860.
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described by Eleanor W. Myers respectively as the “three-party” v. “two-party” model.155
The three-party model refers to three involved parties, e.g. counsel, the client and a third
party, while the two-party model refers to the relationship between counsel and her client.
Myers observes that referring to “independence” for two quite distinct meanings, the first
one focusing more on loyalty to the client and the second one referring more to a distance
from the client: “obscures the differences between them.” She further suggests that “[it]
may also lead to a failure to acknowledge the tension between loyalty and independence.
Concealing that tension may favor one value over the other. For example, an overly
mechanical application of the conflict of interest rules, which are designed, in part, to
assure independence from third-party interests to preserve loyalty to clients, has the
potential to undermine counsel’s independence from the client (the two-party model).” 156

The greater emphasis placed on this duty of independence from the client leads certain
European bars to view the practice of law and working as employee for a single client, as
two incompatible functions. As recently stated by the Court of First Instance of the
European Communities in the Akzo157 case: “The requirement as to the position and
status as an independent lawyer…..is based on a concept of the lawyer’s role as
collaborating in the administration of justice by the courts and as being required to
provide, in full independence, and in the overriding interests of the administration of
justice, such legal assistance as the client needs.”158 The test adopted by the Court to
assess whether legal advice was provided in full independence was that the legal advice
“was provided by a lawyer who, structurally, hierarchically and functionally, is a third
party in relation to the undertaking receiving that advice.”159 Bar regulations singling out
in-house counsel on that basis illustrate that a greater emphasis is placed, at least in
155

Myers, supra note 52, at 861; as the author also points out at 858: “Independence in the sense that many are using it,
meaning independence from third-party interests, both obscures the tension between loyalty and independence and
overlooks independence from the client as one of the important aspects of the lawyer's professional obligations”.
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Myers, supra note 52, at 861.
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Supra note 14.
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Ibid, at par.166, this decision was affirmed by the Grand Chamber in September 2010, supra note 15.
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Ibid, at par.168, similar conclusions were reached by the Grand Chamber, in the Akzo case, Grand Chamber, supra
note 15, paragraphs 45 to 48.
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theory, in overriding interests of the administration of justice than it is the case with bars
that do not make a distinction between in-house and outside counsel. 160 Whether this
marked differentiation between how in-house and outside counsel are regulated is the
ideal model in practice is another question.,161

While our Codes of Professional Conduct abound with examples of the “Three-party”
model of professional independence, 162 the “Two-party” model, the one that refers to a
certain restraint from the client, is not as explicitly outlined (to use the categorization
models of Myers).163 The “Two-party” model of professional independence needs to be
inferred by the overall content and general intent of Codes of Professional Conduct, and
the presence of duties that may compete with the several professional duties that flow
from the core obligation to preserve the client’s interest. Indeed, the lawyer owes a duty
to the state, to the courts, to the client, to the profession, to her colleagues and to
herself. 164 To fulfill those parallel and contemporaneous duties, the lawyer inevitably has
160

For a comparative analysis between French legal ethics and American and English legal ethics, see, J. Leubsdorf,
Man in His Original Dignity, Legal ethics in France (Darthmouth, Ashgate, 2001) at pp.13-28, in particular, on the
requirement of independence from the client.
161

As I discuss throughout Part II of this paper, while issues of independence from the client may arise
more frequently for in-house counsel, they are not unique to them and may be present with outside counsel
as well. This raises some doubt as to whether impeaching in-house counsel from being members of their
bar is justified and adequately addresses the issue of professional independence from the client.
162
References to independence point towards the duty to be free from any interference to unequivocally serve the
interests of the client such as the absence of any conflicts of interest with another client, between the lawyer and the
client, or any other outside factor that may impair the lawyer judgment in providing legal services to the client. See for
example the rules dealing with conflict of interests: CBA Code, supra note 7, at Chapter V and VI; LSUC Rules, supra
note 7, at 2.04 to 2.06; L.S.B.C. Code, supra note 20, at Chapter 6 and 7; L.S.A. Code, supra note 7, at Chapter 6,
commentary G.3 which are mainly geared towards preserving the client interest; performing non legal functions: L.
S.U. C. Rules, supra note 8, at 6.04; The CBA Code, supra note 7, at Chapter VII; L.S.A. Code, supra note 7, at
Chapter 15.
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Myers, supra note 52, at 861; the L.S.B.C. Code Supra note 21, is more explicit on the parallel and
contemporaneous interests that the lawyer needs to serve in addition to the client interests: see Chapter 1 “Canons of
Legal Ethics”; the Québec Code of Ethics, supra note 7, 3.06.05: “An advocate shall safeguard his professional
independence regardless of the circumstances in which he engages in his professional activities. In particular, he must
not let his professional judgment be subject to pressure exerted on him by anyone whomsoever.”; Rule 3.00.01 states
that “ An advocate owes the client a duty of skill as well as obligations of loyalty, integrity, independence, impartiality,
diligence and prudence”.
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Smith, supra note 3, at 16 and fol.; the L.S.B.C. Code, Supra, note 20, at Chapter 1 “Canons of Legal Ethics”; see
also the L.S.A. Code, supra note 7, at Chapter 1, Rule 1., which states that the lawyer must uphold the law in
delivering advice to the client; see the CBA Code, supra note 7, preamble: “The essence of professional responsibility
is that the lawyer must act at all times uberrimae fidei, with utmost good faith to the court, to the client, to other
lawyers, and to members of the public.”, as well as at Chapter XIII The Lawyer and the Administration of Justice,
Chapter XV Responsibility to the Profession Generally, Chapter XVI Responsibility to lawyers and others, and Chapter
XX No Discrimination, which all enumerate duties of professional and ethical conduct that exemplify parallel and
potentially conflicting duties with the lawyer duties geared towards serving and preserving the client interests.
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to maintain a certain degree of independence from the client and her cause. 165 A proper
application of these rules, it seems, would be facilitated by an order of priority or
hierarchy between parallel and simultaneous duties in case they conflict with one and the
other. Some commentators argue that the first duty of the lawyer is to the state or more
generally, the public interest.166 If there is such a paramount duty that sits higher in the
hierarchy of the professional duties of lawyers, one that encapsulates the duty of
professional independence from the client, our Codes of Professional Conduct do not
reflect it. By contrast, the emphasis that our Codes of Professional Conduct put on the
“Three-party” model of professional independence, places in-house counsel in a
privileged position. If the core duty that our self-regulated profession values above all is
the duty of loyalty to the client, then in-house counsel are better situated to fulfill this
duty, given the unparalleled knowledge of the business that their position affords and
because of their entire and undivided devotion to a single client.

One explanation for the lack of clarity around the nature and scope of the duty of
independence from the client is that it is more controversial,167 and that it is more likely
to come in conflict with other professional duties that are considered paramount. For
instance, the professional duty of confidentiality with respect to the client and the very
limited instances where it can be waived by the lawyer (even when the client has or is
about to commit criminal or unlawful activities), reinforce the duty of loyalty to the
client. It is part of the fundamental right of adequate legal representation. It reflects a
strong belief of our legal system that the client can only be well served with an unfettered
duty of confidentiality in her favor, and an almost absolute solicitor-client privilege.168
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See Fox, supra note 129, at 553, where the author describes the duty of independence from the client as one of the
core values of the legal profession.
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Smith, supra note 3, at 16 and fol. For instance, she should never assist a client in committing an illegal or a criminal

act: LSBC Rules, supra, note 21, at Chapter 1, Canons of legal ethics, paragraph 1.(1); CBA Code, supra note 7, at
Chapter III “Advising Clients”, commentary 7; L.S.A. Code, supra note 7, at Chapter 14, Rule 2.
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Gordon, supra note 42, at 11-12.
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Pritchard v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 809, at paragraphs 14, 16-18. For a criticism of
the confidentiality privilege applying to large organization clients, see D. Luban, Lawyers and Justice (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1988), Chapter 10, “Corporate Counsel and Confidentiality”, 206.
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Recent attempts to add new exceptions to the CBA Code,169 i.e. “whistle blowing”
provisions similar to the ones adopted in 2003 by the American Bar Association (the
“ABA Model Rules”)170 have stirred a heated debate.171 As a result, the CBA Code
remained substantially unchanged. 172 The ABA Model Rules modifications, which raised
a no less heated debate, now allow counsel to divulge confidential information of their
client to prevent a crime or fraud or substantial injury to financial interests of another
person.173 While there is some variance on the scope of the duty of confidentiality, there
is no similar exception to the duty of confidentiality in Canada.174 In case of fraud, crime
or other illegal acts, the lawyer’s power of action is limited to going “up the ladder” in
the corporate organization,175 withdraw from the case and eventually to resign. 176 The
result is that counsel may interpret the scope of their duty of loyalty to the client as overly
broad and feel constrained and ill equipped to face situations where other paramount
interests are equally at stake. The arguments put forward against whistle-blowing
provisions are that they threaten the privileged relation of confidence and candor that inhouse counsel are able to develop by reason of their unique position, by creating a
perception that they are a “cop” and not an advisor.177 It also diminishes in-house
counsel’s ability to exercise persuasive influence. Other commentators argue that on the
contrary, whistle-blowing provisions give in-house counsel more clarity on their legal
and ethical duties and that they can be used as a lever when it comes to ensuring
169

Supra note 8.
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American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, (“ABA Model Rules”) available online at the
American Bar Association website at www.abanet.org (last visited on February 6, 2011).
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Paton, supra note 13, at 557-558.
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CBA Code, supra note 7, at Chapter IV, “Confidentiality” and Commentary 18.
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ABA Model Rules, supra note 170, Model Rule 1.6.
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Supra note 105.
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To reconcile the duty of confidentiality with the obligation not to encourage the perpetration of a fraudulent act,
crime or unlawful activity, some rules of conduct contain an “up the ladder reporting obligation”: L.S.U.C. Rules,
supra note 7, at. 2.02 (5) to (5.2); Québec Code of Ethics, supra note 7, 3.05.18.
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L.S.A. Code, supra note 7, at Chapter 14; L.S.B.C. Rules, supra note 20, at Chapter 10.
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Veasey and Di Guglielmo, supra note 33, at 24: discuss this phenomenon and how this makes law makers careful in
making any policy changes that may have a negative impact on the relationship of trust between the corporate counsel
and the representatives of the client-corporations.
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compliance with the law.178 It also gives them more courage and power to act
independently. 179 The use of this procedure is likely to remain highly exceptional and
any abusive recourse to this procedure seem improbable: the inherent pressures and
complexities of counsel functions point towards more restraint than overuse. The fear of
“breaking communication channels’” line of argument is harder to justify to the public
when what we are trying to prevent is the commission of a criminal act or securities
fraud. In essence, the whistle-blowing provisions180 come as an aid, as an “exist strategy”
to counsel, and to the corporation and the public best interest, when counsel’s persuasive
advice to comply with the law has failed. This resistance to any regulation that
encroaches on the sacrosanct relationship between counsel and corporate clients, even to
prevent the commission of criminal acts and fraud, may be another illustration of the
failure by the legal profession to recognize the desirability and benefits181 of a greater
distance and independence of counsel from the client.

Codes of Professional Conduct allow much flexibility on the various approaches to
lawyering. There is also a rich debate in the scholarly literature on the ideal role of
counsel. 182 In this context, counsel (both in-house and outside counsel) can be torn
between very different models. They are given little guidance on how to interpret
conflicts between professional duties as they arise. In some areas of practice, the checks
and balances assuring a proper order of precedence between the various professional
duties may not be as prevalent, making the application of the rules in Codes of
Professional Conduct more ambiguous and problematic. 183 Among the various ideal
178

Paton, supra note 13, at 558; Duggin, supra note 5, at 1004: the author points to evidence indicating that business

managers realize the importance and are more inclined to seek out “candid legal advice” in the aftermath of the
Sarbanes-Oxley new regulation environment.
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Paton, supra note 13, at 558; Veasey and Di Guglielmo, supra note 33, at 21.
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For instance, a transactional lawyer does not interact with the courts and the judiciary, one instance where the
interests of clients are more directly confronted to other interests such as preserving the proper administration of
justice, deference to the courts, interaction with the other party.
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models of lawyering that are proposed, one is of particular interest to our discussion on
the need to better articulate the duty of professional from the client. Some commentators
argue that the role of counsel includes the one of “gatekeeper”,184 particularly so in the
context of public corporations. Although this position is controversial in the legal
community, it reflects an interesting attempt to articulate a broader array of interests and
duties than the duty of ensuring the most successful outcome to the client alone. It signals
that legal professionalism should also entail maintaining a proper distance from the client.

Any attempt to establish a hierarchy amongst counsel’s professional duties is eminently
complex because of the inherent conflicts within their various roles. For instance on the
one hand, in the role of preserving the rule of law, of preserving the independence of their
profession and of preserving their clients’ interests,185 lawyers have a duty to remain
critical of the state and unencumbered by it in the fulfillment of their professional
duties.186 On the other hand, these fundamental goals and duties need to be accomplished
in support of and compliance with our democratic institutions. While a lawyer may
criticize a law and actively take part in any legislative process to improve it, she should
not disobey the law, nor encourage any one to do so.

Establishing a hierarchy between the various professional duties of counsel may be
impractical or extremely difficult to achieve. However, a poor articulation by the legal
profession of the duty of professional independence from the client, and of the ideal
model of lawyering, as well as the lack of concrete mechanisms to give effect to such
duty, provide little support to in-house counsel (and to a certain extent outside counsel).
They may face ethical dilemmas in an environment where the strong promotion of
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Kim, supra note 11.
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See for example the CBA Code, supra note 7, Chapter IX The Lawyer as Advocate “When acting as an advocate,
the lawyer must treat the court or tribunal with courtesy and respect and must represent the client resolutely,
honourably and within the limits of the law.”
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As Harry Arthurs explains, paradoxically, as much as the legal profession proclaims its independence from the
state and is by essence in opposition with the state, in many ways, it is also “deeply implicated in the state”: H. Arthurs,
“Lawyering In Canada In The 21st Century” (1996) 15 Windsor Y.B. Access to Just. 202, at 204-207.
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undivided loyalty to the client,187 amplified by the overall structure of in-house legal
departments and law firm practices, leave broader duties to the public and to the legal
profession vague, remote or even unknown. The Enron, Tyco and Worldcom scandals
show all too well where a lack of distance from the client can lead to, and how the public
can be let down not only by senior executives, but also by lawyers.

Articulated rules of conduct – in this instance on the duty of professional independence
from the client- can never completely prevent the commission of a crime or always
nurture rightful and well guided actions by counsel. But they could give concrete
ammunition to counsel, particularly to in-house counsel, in reminding their clientcorporation through its representatives, why they hired a professional lawyer in the first
place. Hugh P. Gunz and Sally P. Gunz point to what should set professionals in general
apart from other employees: “if professionals are not able to retain sufficient
independence so as to defend their professional integrity in critical decisions, why,
ultimately, pay a premium for their skills? What distinguishes them from any other
manager?”188 A stronger duty of professional independence from the client could also
protect the client who may be misguided at times about the proper course of action to
take. From that perspective, it supports the primary duty of counsel to provide legal
services in a competent and diligent manner. Some form of duty of professional
independence from the client does and needs to exist in order to reconcile the various
professional duties of counsel. The void that currently prevails as to its exact nature, and
with respect to concrete mechanisms to support its application, needs to be filled. While it
may not eliminate the ethical dilemmas that are inherent to the practice of law -whether
by in-house or by outside counsel- it may alleviate them significantly.

It is puzzling how bars are unequivocal about the importance of preserving their
independence from the state, but only timidly articulate, at the individual member level,
the duty of professional independence from the client. Clearly, the independence of the
legal profession from the state serves a critical function in support of our democratic
187

As they are reinforced by unfettered duties of confidentiality.
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Gunz and Gunz, supra note 13, at 249-250, citing M. Davis, “Professional Autonomy: A Framework for Empirical
Research” (1996) 6 Bus. Ethics Q. 441, at 454-455.

43

institutions. But this does not alleviate the responsibility that the legal profession owes
towards the public. Resisting state encroachment in how the legal profession regulates
counsel on the basis of independence should not be confused with the substantive issues
that the state is trying to resolve at any given time, such as the need to protect investors
adequately. Protecting the public interest beyond ensuring adequate legal representation
of individual clients, should serve as one important justification and legitimacy of their
self-regulatory status. As a trade-off of retaining their independence, the bars need to
weigh in some of the public interest functions that are normally borne by the state. As
Susanna M. Kim points out: “In comparison to all other professions, the legal profession
is the most free of external governmental control. Given the enormous amount of
independence that is afforded to lawyers in this context, they have a special responsibility
to the public and to the system of law to regulate their behavior in the public interest.”189
In addition to offering support to counsel and to clients, a better articulation of the duty of
professional independence from the client also serves the public, beyond ensuring the
quality of the immediate representation needs of each individual client. Without this
recalibration, the legal profession runs the risk of being perceived as compromising its
independence for the sake of other powerful interests outside the state, and by the same
token, of promoting the self-interest of its members too strongly.

By way of preliminary conclusion, given the little emphasis that the legal profession
currently places on the duty of professional independence from the client, there is no
justification to regulate in-house counsel differently than outside counsel. The equal
treatment in the regulation of in-house and outside counsel by the legal profession is
consistent with the predominant value that it accords to the fundamental right to
adequate legal representation and the duty of loyalty to the client . It is also consistent
with an anemic articulation by the legal profession of the duty of professional
independence from the client. And yet, such duty exists. Without it, counsel’s duties to
the court, the legal profession, the state and the public cannot be fulfilled. Professional
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Kim, supra note 5, at 255.
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independence from the client can also enable counsel to better fulfill their duty to serve
their client in a competent and diligent manner and preserve their client’s best interests.

IV. Alleviating ethical dilemmas of (in-house) counsel

The discussion in Part II of this paper points to potential areas of concern for in-house
counsel, and in some cases outside counsel, on the ideal degree of independence that they
need to maintain from the client, i.e. one that can allow them to reconcile their diverging
professional duties. Commentators are raising doubt about the real existence on the
terrain, of professional autonomy from the client for in-house and outside counsel. 190 The
analysis in Part II of this paper also reveals that in-house counsel are in a privileged
position to promote important core values of the legal profession and that as such, their
role in the legal profession should be recognized and encouraged. The lack of articulation
of a duty of professional independence from the client by the legal profession, and of
appropriate mechanisms to actualize it, provide little support and guidance to in-house
counsel and to some extent outside counsel.191 It leaves them and their client in a
vulnerable position.192

The following remarks and recommendations involve a mix of substantive issues and
implementation considerations. They give prominence to Codes of Professional Conduct
as one important tool to encapsulate substantive goals and rules that are further
strengthened by concrete implementation mechanisms. Although there is doubt about the
relevance and effectiveness of Codes of Professional Conduct in regulating professional
conduct or in resolving ethical issues,193 their binding nature on members of the legal
190

Nelson and Nielson question claims to the existence of professional autonomy from the client by inhouse and outside counsel representing corporate clients, based on a review of legal ethics literature
covering the 20th century which points towards a close alignment with client interests: Nelson and Nielson,
supra note 6 at 486-487.
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Kim, supra note 5, at 257.
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M. A.Wilkinson, C. Walker & P. Mercer, “Do Codes of Ethics Actually Shape Legal Practice?” (2000) 45 McGill
L.J. 645 at 653, 655, 678: in a study involving the interview of 180 lawyers in Ontario (of which 30 were in-house
counsel, in various Ontario centers and various size of law firms) one purpose of the interviews was to determine the
extent to which lawyers referred to the code of conduct in their legal practice. Only 16% of the respondents mentioned
the code of conduct in their interviews. See also Nelson and Nielson, supra note 6 at 490, where the author explains that
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profession, makes them an ideal vehicle to incentivize respect for counsel’s professional
duties. In that spirit, Codes of Professional Conduct should articulate as clearly as is
practicably possible, the goals of the legal profession, and how counsel are expected to
individually fulfill these goals. In addition, rules to ensure that the structural environment
in which counsel evolve is aligned with their professional duties need to be in place.

The “ideal” approach to lawyering is an essential issue for the understanding of the
position of in-house counsel in the legal profession. Yet, there is clearly a lack of
consensus on what that ideal should be.194 Greater clarity and articulation around that
ideal is a pre-condition to any meaningful regulatory review of in-house counsel and
other groups within the legal profession.195 This exercise is also only possible with a
greater introspection into the ideal of the legal profession as a whole and into the
meaning of its independence. The two are ineluctably intertwined.196

Codes of Professional Conduct generally remind counsel that the client is the corporation
and not its representatives. Raising the potential conflicts of interests that it may pose and
providing for a conflict of interest procedure to follow (inspired by client-to-client
conflict of interest rules) could provide additional guidance and support to counsel.
However, the difficulty will often reside in identifying the conflict of interest in the first
place. Acting in the best interest of the client’s corporation may in some cases be open to
very diverging opinions. Counsel’s trust in or allegiance to the representative of the
corporation may be so high that counsel will rely on the representative’s view of the
the way in –house counsel construct their role is shaped in large part by how business clients and senior executives
react to the way they provide legal advice. In that sense, it is very much a reciprocal process among counsel, their
“clients” and senior management.
194
Wilkinson, Mercer & Strong, supra note 61, at 375-382, reviewed the legal ethics literature on the role of lawyers
and placed it in two categories: authors promoting the counselor role and the ones promoting the “hired gun” role. The
authors argued how the literature presented each role as mutually exclusive. This seemed to contradict both Ontario law
and the L.S.U.C. rules of conduct whereby the role of the lawyer is closer to a continuum of the counselor and hired
gun roles rather than one to the exclusion of the other (at 388 and 390). This continuum of roles was confirmed by the
empirical study that they conducted based on interviews with Ontario lawyers (at 409).
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In the Canadian context, Paton, supra note 13, at 561, after pointing to the complexity and various ethical dilemma
that in-house counsel face in their everyday work, maintains that a review of the Rules of Professional Conduct to
address the unique challenges that in-house counsel face should be a first order priority.
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interest of the corporation or would not even detect the existence of a conflict of interest.
Articulating the likelihood of such conflicts in Codes of Professional Conduct or related
instruments can alert counsel and increase their awareness to such ethical issues. Some of
the structural recommendations made further below can also offer significant support to
counsel who are confronted to a potential conflict of interest.

Even if the concept of the duty of professional independence from the client is
controversial, such a duty nevertheless exists. The legal profession needs to engage in a
dialogue on its scope. When doing so, it should be mindful of the perils of too weak a
duty of professional independence from the client. Ultimately, such soul searching should
be aimed at providing stronger support to counsel, with tangible implementation
mechanisms to facilitate its actualization. A better articulation of the duty of professional
independence from the client raises fundamental issues that relate to the core values of
the legal profession. It will need to address the potential conflicts with more established
and recognized professional duties. For instance, the duty of professional independence
is potentially in conflict with the fundamental right of adequate legal representation, the
general duty of loyalty of counsel and the near-absolute nature of the solicitor-client
privilege.197 For that reason, “whistle blowing” or similar provisions are viewed as a
threat to these sacrosanct rights and duties and often encounter fierce resistance in the
legal profession. At the same time, such provisions are concrete tools for counsel to take
a distance from the client to serve other paramount public interests. There is doubt about
their efficacy, in part because there may be a natural inhibition to have recourse to such
mechanisms. This can be explained by the fear of negative retaliation or by the fear of
taking responsibility for the drastic consequences that whistle-blowing mechanisms can
lead to. At the same time, their mere existence and the conduct that they seek to clarify
and promote can, in and of themselves provide important support to counsel facing
seemingly conflicting ethical obligations.

A clearer articulation of the duty of professional independence from the client should not
necessarily lead to a radically different treatment of in-house counsel, as it is presently
197
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the case in some European countries judging the practice of law to be incompatible with
being a salaried employee of the client. The authority that emanates from a membership
to an independent bar would be lost, and with it the ability to effectively provide legal
representation with an important preventive and compliance component. The clearer
articulation of the duty of professional independence from the client should aim at
invigorating the position of in-house counsel (and other counsel) rather than weaken it.
In-house counsel have the privileged ability to promote several core values of the legal
profession. This ability needs to be better recognized and supported. The complexity and
role fluidity that may initially draw lawyers to practice law in-house may become less
appealing to them after a closer look,198 even more so in light of recent corporate scandals
involving in-house counsel.199 Safeguards that are specific to in-house counsel, such as
special agreements on conditions of employment imposed by some bars, should be
considered if they help achieve this goal. 200

Based on the reflection and articulation of the duty of professional independence from the
client, Codes of Professional Conduct ought to generally better articulate the ideal role of
counsel. For instance, this could be achieved by offering a clearer delineation of the
duties owed to the administration of justice, the legal profession and the public, beyond
the duty of loyalty and confidentiality201 owed to the client (including through its
representatives). In that vein, the zones of tension where this ideal role can be
compromised (for example, through conflicting ideals with client expectations, or when
counsel cumulate various legal and non legal functions) need to be better identified. In-
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professional duties such as the duty not to encourage the commission of any illegal act or actions to be taken when a
lawyer becomes aware that an illegal act is about to be committed.
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house and outside counsel need to be provided with the necessary tools to realize this
ideal.202 A duty reminding counsel that reporting structures,203 performance evaluation
and monetary incentives204 (whether for in-house or outside counsel) should be aligned
with those ideals and the corresponding duties, can play a significant role in ensuring
better compliance with counsel’s professional duties.205 Targeting specific methods of
remuneration that can have a detrimental effect on compliance with professional duties
should be considered. Codes of Professional Conduct could generally raise concern for
any mode of remuneration that may come in conflict with serving the best interests of the
client while retaining independent professional judgment. Specific proposals have been
put forward to redress such misalignments. One of them is that board of directors of
publicly traded companies should be directly involved in the selection and evaluation of
general counsel.206 Another suggestion is that performance objectives should incite
ethical behavior and the exercise of independent professional judgment, and that in-house
counsel should be rewarded for this.207 In that vein, the practice of stock options and
departmental bonuses has been raised as posing potential ethical issues around the duty of
professional independence.208 Generally, rules requiring that the performance evaluation
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and remuneration methods of counsel (both in-house and outside) need to be aligned with
their professional conduct obligations, would be a first step to address the potential
impact of remuneration on ethical behaviors. Their proper implementation by law firms
and in-house legal departments would provide greater support to in-house and outside
counsel, alleviating the likely occurrences of ethical dilemmas caused by compensation
and performance incentives. 209

There should be a specific requirement in Canadian professional bars to pursue
continuing education in legal ethics.210 Imposing it as a requirement (and monitoring the
same through annual filings and disclosures) could be an important way to keep counsel
(and in particular in-house counsel) appraised of legal ethics issues and recent
developments. Continuing education on legal ethics as a requirement to maintain
membership to the bar would exemplify an even stronger commitment to compliance by
the legal profession. It would stimulate an ongoing conversation between members of the
legal profession and the public that may lead to a more refined understanding of the
ethical issues confronting counsel. In turn this could lead to more adapted responses and
solutions by the legal profession. The various professional associations also need to give
more visibility and provide better support to their members in the area of legal ethics.211
The need to appoint ethics officers in larger in-house legal department and law firms,
with reporting duties on their activities would be another way to promote a greater
awareness of legal ethics and raise its profile.
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V. Conclusion

The analysis of in-house counsel within the legal profession shows the complexity of the
task that any regulation on the role of counsel entails. It is incumbent upon the
justifications that withstand the independence of the legal profession and the role that it is
called to play, for which, beyond certain fundamental principles, there is no clear
consensus. At a more immediate and concrete level, it shows the difficult balancing act
with which counsel, the legal profession and the bars are confronted with.Providing more
guidance and tools at the regulatory level to alleviate the undue burden of conflicting
allegiances is essential if the legal profession is to support and even promote the practice
of law by in-house counsel. To this end, a better understanding of how clients generally
seek out counsel for legal advice and apply it, as well as of the scope and limits of
counsel’s actual influence on their client, is also critical.212 In the end, the
recommendations for reform made in this paper would not only benefit in-house counsel,
but also outside counsel, their clients, the legal profession and the public.213

Urging the legal profession self-regulating bodies to better articulate the meaning and
foundation of their independence, and to also provide more clarity on the degree of
independence from the client may lead to further research and debate on other areas of
counsel’s role that have not been explored in this paper. For instance, how the duty of
professional independence from the client should be articulated when counsel contribute
to scientific publications and participate in professional education panels and debates?
The discussion of this paper may also be of relevance to other debates within the legal
profession, such as the issues that revolve around multidisciplinary practice. Proposals
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for further developments and transformation of the legal profession in that direction are
likely to resurface in one form or the other in a not so distant future.
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